Not  If  but  How : Reflecting on the ABA Commission\u27s Recommendations on Multidisciplinary Practice by Matheson, John H & Adams, Edward S
Scholarship Repository 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2000 
Not "If" but "How": Reflecting on the ABA Commission's 
Recommendations on Multidisciplinary Practice 
John H. Matheson 
University of Minnesota Law School, mathe001@umn.edu 
Edward S. Adams 
University of Minnesota Law School, adams006@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John H. Matheson and Edward S. Adams, Not "If" but "How": Reflecting on the ABA Commission's 
Recommendations on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1269 (2000), available at 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/94. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu. 
Not "If" but "How": Reflecting on the
ABA Commission's Recommendations on
Multidisciplinary Practice
John H. Mathesont and Edward S. Adamstt
I. INTRODUCTION
Multidisciplinary practice (MDP) has been aptly described
as the "most important issue facing the legal profession today."'
The American Bar Association's Commission on Multidisciplin-
ary Practice (Commission) surprised most observers on June 8,
1999 by recommending that the American Bar Association
(ABA) amend the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules) to allow lawyers to combine with, and share fees with,
other professionals within a single professional entity.2 Under
t S. Walter Richey Professor of Corporate Law and Co-Director of the
Center for Business Law and Entrepreneurship at the University of Minne-
sota Law School. Of Counsel at Kaplan, Strangis and Kaplan, P.A., Minnea-
polls, MN. I would like to thank Peter Favorite, Class of 2000, for excellent
research assistance on this Article.
t Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Julius E. Davis Chair and Pro-
fessor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for Business Law and Entrepre-
neurship at the University of Minnesota Law School. President and CEO of
Equity Securities Investments, Inc., Minneapolis, MN. Principal at Jon Ad-
ams Financial Co., LLP, Wayzata, MN.
1. Darryl Van Duch, ABA Honchos Differ over MDP Vote, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 23, 1999, at A6. This is, for instance, the description used by the Presi-
dent of the American Bar Association, William G. Paul. See id.
2. COMUISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
REPORT (1999), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.html>
[hereinafter REPORT]. There are a few terms used in this paper which typi-
cally carry a precise meaning. For the sake of clarity, short definitions are
provided here. The term "MDP" is defined, for the purposes of both the Com-
mission and this Article, as:
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or en-
tity that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as one, but not all,
of its purposes the delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than
the MDP itself or that holds itself out to the public as providing non-
legal, as well as legal, services. It includes an arrangement by which
a law firm joins with one or more other professional firms to provide
services, and there is a direct or indirect sharing of profits as part of
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the proposal, lawyers could create partnerships with account-
ants, developers, engineers, bankers, and all other profession-
als, thereby giving clients access to one-stop shopping at multi-
disciplinary firms.
The recent expansion of nonlegal professional firms-typi-
cally accounting firms-into the practice of law has moved
some commentators to propose "necessary" changes concerning
the regulation of lawyers, and at the same time has prompted
others to demand that the profession resist the temptation to
change. The subject of the necessary change, or the dangerous
temptation, is multidisciplinary practice. Proponents of MDPs
cite globalization of markets, advances in technology and in-
formation sharing, expansive governmental regulation of com-
mercial and private activities, and clients' demands as reasons
for changing the regulation of lawyers. These clients, say those
in favor of MDPs, more than ever before desire coordinated ad-
vice from lawyers, financial planners, accountants, social work-
ers, and other professionals. As the global economy expands,
both large and small business clients will look to teams of pro-
fessionals from different disciplines for consolidated advice on
complex commercial and regulatory issues. 3
Some argue that the Commission's Report and Recommen-
dation on MDPs simply realizes and accepts trends that have
been evolving for years in the United States and, for that mat-
ter, throughout the world. While the specific techniques of
partnership and fee sharing among lawyers and nonlawyers
has hardly been the norm, some legal and nonlegal professional
firms are so interdependent that the technical prohibitions on
partnership and fee sharing have become mere outdated, both-
ersome obstacles. 4 On the other hand, those opposing MDPs,
the arrangement.
COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REPORT
APPENDIX A (1999), available at <http'/www.abanet.orgfcpr/mdpappendixa.
html> [hereinafter APPENDIX A]. "Legal services" is defined as those services
which are considered the "practice of law" by relevant professional regulations.
Id. "Practice of law" means "the provision of professional legal advice or serv-
ices where there is a [lawyer-]client relationship of trust or reliance." Id.
Such services include, among others, preparing or expressing legal opinions
and appearing or acting as an attorney. See id.
3. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, BACKGROUND PAPER ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE: ISSUES AND
DEVELOPMENTS (1999), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/
cpr/multicomreport0199.html> [hereinafter BACKGROUND PAPER].
4. See ABA Urges One-Stop Shopping, J. ACCT., Sept. 1, 1999, at 15, 15-
17.
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while recognizing the steady change in professional firms over
the years, argue that the changes have reached a critical point,
and that these changes must be answered with the mainte-
nance or strengthening-not the relaxation-of the current
regulations.
We agree generally with the proponents of MDPs who sug-
gest regulating such entities to the extent necessary to preserve
the essential attributes of the attorney-client relationship. In-
deed, well before the Commission's Report, we were on record
as supporting access by lawyers to capital markets by allowing
nonlawyer investment in law firms. 5 The issues surrounding
the MDP issue, while broader in scope, involve substantially
similar concerns. In Part II, we explore the reasons why the
MDP issue is of such current concern. In Part III, we examine
and comment on the Commission's process and product. Fi-
nally, in Part IV, we address the issues of professional integrity
which form the basis for the intellectual attack on permitting
MDPs.
II. WHY IS MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE AN ISSUE
AT ALL?
The emergence, or re-emergence, of the MDP issue began
roughly ten years ago. The accounting profession was search-
ing for new growth opportunities, and began to offer corpora-
tions a large variety of professional services. Consulting firms
followed suit, aggressively promoting "services remarkably
similar to those traditionally offered by law firms, such as ad-
vice on mergers and acquisitions, estate planning, human re-
sources, and litigation support systems."6 This strategy was
based on the concept of full service stations-firms that would
cover all of a corporation's significant needs. The legal profes-
sion took note of these purportedly troubling developments.7
From one perspective these developments should not be
troubling at all. If some members of the legal profession wish
to maintain the single service focus of the practice of law, they
5. See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big
Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1998).
6. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 3.
7. "1I think it's a fact that the accounting firms are winning the war
when it comes to who's going to represent business.'" John Gib6aut, Squeeze
Play, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 42, 44 (quoting Roger L. Page, national tax prac-
tice director for Deloitte & Touche).
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should do so. Alternatively, if professional services firms feel
the need to expand into the legal services market in order to
meet client needs and to enhance their own business growth,
they should do so. The problem with these last two statements
is that neither reflects reality for at least two reasons. First,
multidisciplinary practice is an issue because the expansion of
professional service firms into the legal market threatens the
viability of traditional law practice. Second, multidisciplinary
practice is an issue because the regulations governing the legal
profession prohibit lawyers from engaging in such a practice.
Let us look at each of these factors in turn.
A. THE MARKET REALITY OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE
The growth of nonlegal professional service firms includes
the practice of hiring more and more lawyers. 8 The employ-
ment of lawyers by accounting firms, for example, necessarily
raises questions of unethical practice (under the Model Rules),
but accounting firms typically manage to dodge this issue by
insisting that their lawyers are not "practicing law," but merely
giving "tax advice."9 Current ABA President William G. Paul
argues that this is one reason for the bar to take aggressive ac-
tion: "Thousands of lawyers are already working for the Big 5
accounting firms."'0 Those lawyers, argues Paul, "need to be
properly regulated.""
While accounting firms contend that they are not practic-
ing law, the matter is clearly one of perspective. What lawyers
contend is practice of law, accountants call "consulting." For
example, under the heading "legal consulting," an accounting
firm might offer advice that covers all stages of the litigation
process, from initiating a claim to negotiating a settlement. 12 It
is still largely unsettled whether the Model Rules prevent law-
yers who work for accounting firms from performing these
8. Arthur Anderson has made public its "goal of becoming the largest law
firm in the world shortly after the year 2000." SPECIAL COMM. ON MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, NEW YORK STATE BAR
Ass'N, REPORT (1999), available at <http'//www.nysba.org/whatsnew/multi
discrpt.html>.
9. Gib~aut, supra note 7, at 44.
10. Van Duch, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 3. Two of the Big Five accounting
firms have been investigated by at least one state for engaging in the unau-
thorized practice of law. See Elizabeth MacDonald, Texas Probes Andersen,
Deloitte on Charges of Practicing Law, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1998, at B15.
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services. The resolution of this issue is, of course, crucial for
the legal profession. "If there aren't differences, then account-
ants don't need to be hiring lawyers," according to Houston
lawyer Steve Salch, past chair of the ABA Tax Section.' 3
Legal distinctions between the professions have blurred a
bit, as well, in the past few years.' 4 Accounting firms, for in-
stance, may now represent clients in tax court, and Congress
recently created an "accountant-client privilege" under the In-
ternal Revenue Code.' 5 Many observers in the legal profession
see the general trend, in law and in business, as one which re-
jects traditional distinctions between lawyers and other profes-
sionals, and these observers warn of dire consequences should
the profession not take heed of this trend.' 6 The definitions
and interpretations of the terms "legal services" and "unau-
thorized practice of law" are, of course, critical. The courts
have yet to tackle these issues with any energy, so the policies
provided by or adopted by the ABA will most likely influence
the profession's course for the foreseeable future. 17
While large law firms are naturally the loudest voice in the
cry for MDP reform, some small and solo providers are also in-
terested in the idea, but perhaps for different reasons. 18 There
is, of course, a hierarchy among professional firms in market-
coverage. Those firms already at the top are interested in
staying there and those immediately below are interested in se-
curing a higher position, and so on. The large law firms are
concerned that large nonlawyer firms are seizing a dangerously
large portion of the professional services market. At the same
time, small law firms expressing support for MDP reform are
13. Gib6aut, supra note 7, at 44.
14. See REPORT, supra note 2.
15. Anna Snider, Lawyers Wary of Accountant-Client Privilege, N.Y. L.J.,
July 17, 1998, at 1.
16. See Gib6aut, supra note 7, at 44 (relating the argument of some law-
yers that MDPs are "a sort of Armageddon for the profession"). On the other
hand, ABA Commissioner Burnele V. Powell relays the sentiments of most
lawyers: "They're saying if we don't have more flexibility [with MDPs], the ac-
countants are going to eat our lunch.' John Gibeaut, Practice Debate Heats
Up, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1999, at 14, 16.
17. For an overview of the many issues related to prohibiting unauthor-
ized practice of law, see generally Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).
18. See COAMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASs'N, REPORTER'S NOTES (1999), available at <http'I/www.abanet.org/cpr/
mdpappendixc.html> [hereinafter REPORTER'S NOTEs].
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interested in opportunities to compete with the large law
firms. 19 On the other hand, lawyers at both large and small
firms are concerned that MDPs are a dangerous temptation for
the profession, seeing the issue as a threat to the profession's
core values, perhaps tarnishing them beyond repair.20
In Europe, the Big Five accounting firms are expanding
into the legal services market. Most European countries have
relaxed restrictions on MDPs, and accounting firms have a
head start on international law firms in taking advantage of
the new market.21 PricewaterhouseCoopers, for example, em-
ploys over 1600 non-tax lawyers outside the United States,
making it in effect the third-largest law firm in the world.22
Thus, while American law firms are beginning to feel the threat
in the United States, they already have lost significant ground
overseas. These business realities are forcing the legal profes-
sion to take action on the MDP issue.
B. THE ABA's REGULATORY SCHEME CONCERNING MDPs
The purpose of regulating lawyers is to protect a lawyer's
independent professional judgment in service to the lawyer's
clients and to the court. Since 1928, the ABA fairly consis-
tently has stood against MDPs. Through its Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA has
sought to limit the influence of third parties on the legal pro-
fession.
Although the ABA is only a professional association and
has no direct authority over lawyers, it nevertheless wields a
powerful influence in informing the judgments of state court
systems and legislatures-the entities directly responsible for
exercising control over the legal profession. The ABA's model
regulations typically are adopted by state authorities in similar
19. Larry Ramirez, head of the ABA's Solo and Small Firm Section, com-
mented that "[i]f solo and small-firm lawyers are able to enter into these kinds
of relationships with other professionals, we can provide the same or similar
service as a big firm, without having the 150-200 lawyer office." Edward
Brodsky, ABA Endorsement of Multidisciplinary Practices, N.Y. L.J., July 14,
1999, at 3, 3, 7.
20. See id. at 7.
21. See generally REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 18; Gianluca Morello,
Note, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for Law Firms: Why Multi-
Discipline Practices Should Be Permitted in the United States, 21 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 190 (1997).
22. See Brodsky, supra note 19, at 3.
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form.2 3 Thus, if one is interested in effecting widespread
changes in the regulation of the legal profession, one had best
pursue those changes within the ABA's model system. Thus,
most likely because of the ABA's profound influence, MDPs are
currently prohibited in all fifty states.24
1. ABA Canons of Ethics
In 1908, the ABA promulgated the original Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics (Canons).25 The Canons represented the ABA's
formal position on matters of legal ethics. As originally prom-
ulgated, the Canons did not address whether practicing law-
yers could enter into business associations with nonlawyers.
Twenty years later, however, the ABA adopted additional rules
which essentially prohibited practicing lawyers from entering
into partnerships or business associations with nonlawyers.26
In 1928 the ABA adopted Canons 33, 34, and 35 prohibit-
ing the partnership of lawyers and nonlegal professionals. 27
Canon 33 stated that "[p]artnerships between lawyers and
members of other professions or non-professional persons
should not be formed or permitted where a part of the partner-
ship business consists of the practice of law."28 Canon 34 pro-
vided that "[n]o division of fees for legal services is proper, ex-
cept with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility."29 Canon 35 added that "the professional serv-
ices of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay
agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client
and lawyer.... [The lawyer] should avoid all relations which
23. See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the
One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 596-600
(1989).
24. The only United States jurisdiction that permits combinations of law-
yers and nonlawyers in the provision of legal services is the District of Colum-
bia. See D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(b) (1990). However,
the District's rules mandate that such firms have as their sole function the
practice of law. See id. Rule 5.4(b)(1).
25. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908), reprinted in COMMITTEE ON
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, OPINIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 11-197 (1967) (annotated ver-
sion).
26. See 53 REP. A.BA. 119-30 (1928) (printing proceedings of the 51st An-
nual ABA Meeting).
27. See id. at 120-30.
28. Id. at 778.
29. Id.
20001 1275
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
direct the performance of his duties in the interest of such in-
termediary."30
These new canons, promulgated by the ABA, drew objec-
tions from the bar. In fact, the drafting committee acknowl-
edged that "there is substantial difference of view in the profes-
sion respecting its recommendations as to partnerships,
division of fees, intermediaries, and the bonding of lawyers."31
At least one member of the drafting committee expressed the
opinion that "aside from professional policy.., there is nothing
inherently 'unethical' in the formation of partnerships between
lawyers largely engaged in certain kinds of work and an expert
engineer, student of finance, or some other form of expert."32 In
the end, this member voted for the proposed canons as a matter
of "professional policy."33 The official reports do not include any
other discussion of the rationale for implementing these rules.
For over forty years the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics (Committee) applied a broad interpretation to the re-
strictions of Canons 33, 34, and 35, consistently ruling that any
business association between lawyers and nonlawyers that of-
fered legal services was prohibited.34 In an opinion addressing
a lawyer's employment by an accounting firm, for example, the
ABA Committee stated:
30. Id. at 779.
31. 52 REP. A.B.A. 378 (1927).
32. Id. at 388 (minority report of F.W. Grinnell).
33. Id.
34. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op.
269 (1945) (requiring an attorney entering into a partnership with a certified
public accountant to specialize in income tax work and related accounting
matters, to cease holding himself out as an attorney-at-law, and to strictly con-
fine his activities to those open only to a lay accountant); id. Formal Op. 257
(1944) (allowing an attorney to enter into a partnership with a layperson who
is an agent licensed by the United States Patent Office if the partnership's ac-
tivities are limited to such as permitted laypersons under patent office rules);
id. Formal Op. 239 (1942) (disallowing a practicing attorney from forming a
partnership with a certified public accountant to act as consultant in tax mat-
ters or to represent taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service Board of
Tax Appeals); id. Formal Op. 201 (1940) (preventing a partnership between an
attorney and layperson where the services rendered, if rendered by an attor-
ney, would constitute the practice of law even though laypersons are allowed
to render the same services under the law); id. Formal Op. 32 (1931) (pre-
venting an attorney from associating with a layperson who is admitted to
prosecute patent applications in the United States Patent Office when the lay-
person does business under the name of a firm holding itself out as "attorneys"
or as "solicitors in patent causes"); id. Formal Op. 31 (1931) (prohibiting a
lawyer from accepting employment at a corporation in the business of prepar-
ing incorporation documents).
[Vol. 84:12691276
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When a lawyer-employee advises his lay employer in regard to a
matter pertaining to the affairs of a client of the employer and the
giving of such advice by the lawyer-employee directly to the client
would involve him in the practice of law, the lawyer is proceeding in
violation of Canon 35 when he operates through his employer as an
intermediary.35
The Committee also thwarted attempts by lawyers to avoid the
rules by entering into non-partnership business associations
with nonlawyers. Although the Committee had allowed law-
yers to form professional law corporations under certain condi-
tions, one such condition prevented any nonlawyer from owning
any interest in the corporation or from acting as a director or
officer of the corporation.36 After noting that "Canon 33 ...
promulgates underlying principles that must be observed no
matter in what form of organization lawyers practice," the
committee asserted:
Canon 33 prohibits the formation of a partnership for the practice
of a partnership between lawyers and non-lawyers. This prohibition
would likewise apply to the practice of law in any other form. Perma-
nent beneficial and voting rights in the organization set up to practice
law, whatever its form, must be restricted to lawyers while the or-
ganization is engaged in the practice of law.3
In brief, the Committee's opinion made it clear that it would
look to substance over form in enforcing Canons 33, 34, and 35.
Subsequently, the ABA incorporated the substance of this
opinion into its next version of ethical rules.
Thus, during the years that the Canons were in force, the
Committee consistently found that these provisions prohibited
nearly any form of partnership between lawyers and nonlegal
professionals that offered services to the public.38 If the lawyer
35. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 297 (1961).
36. See id. Formal Op. 303 (1961). Opinion 303 permitted attorneys to
practice in the corporate form provided that:
(1) the lawyer rendering the legal services to the client must be per-
sonally responsible to the client; (2) restrictions on liability as to other
lawyers in the organization must be made apparent to the client; (3)
none of the stockholders may be non-lawyers, or if stock falls into the
hands of laymen, provision must be made for transfer back to law-
yers; (4) there must be no profit-sharing plans including employees
who are non-lawyers; and (5) no layman may be permitted to partici-
pate in the management of the firm.
Id.
37. Id.
38. See Andrews, supra note 23, at 586.
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completely disassociated himself from the profession, of course,
the lawyer could enter such partnerships. 39
2. ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
In 1969, the Canons of Ethics were replaced by another
regulatory framework, the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Model Code).40 Canons 33, 34, and 35 were re-
placed by different language and titles, but the prohibitions
remained remarkably similar.
The Model Code's prohibition on multidisciplinary partner-
ships reads: "A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a
non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of
the practice of law."41 The Model Code's prohibition on fee
splitting among lawyers and nonlegal professionals stated that
"[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a
non-lawyer."42 The Model Code did not retain the nonlawyer
oversight provision as a distinct rule, but expressed much the
same prohibition in various parts of its text. One provision
prohibits a lawyer from being part of a professional corporation
in which the lawyer's professional judgment is directed or con-
trolled by a nonlawyer. 43 Another prohibits the regulation of a
lawyer's professional judgment by a nonlawyer who pays or
employs that lawyer."
The Committee has seldom visited MDP issues since the
institution of the Model Code, but the Committee's opinions
have interpreted ethics rules to prohibit the partnership of
lawyers and nonlawyers when such partnership is for profit,
when the nonlawyer has a strong managerial or financial role,
and when the organization's business is law or is law-related. 45
3. ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Fifteen years later, the ABA revised its ethical regulations
in adopting the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules).46 Despite the technical changes, the general prohibi-
39. See id. at 587.
40. 94 REP. A.B-.A 389-91 (1969).
41. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBmrrY DR 3-103(A) (1980).
42. Id. DR 3-102(A).
43. See id. DR 5-107(C)(3).
44. See id. DR 5-107(B).
45. For a concise description of the Committee's opinions and action, see
Andrews, supra note 23, at 591-93.
46. Over 40 states have adopted portions of the Model Rules. Unlike the
[Vol. 84:12691278
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tions on MDPs, fee splitting, and nonlawyer oversight were
continued.
Critical to the issues of MDP are the restrictions found in
Model Rule 5.4. Since this Rule is directly related to the issues
discussed in this paper, it is quoted at length here:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlaw-
yer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner,
or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable
period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to one
or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, dis-
abled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule
1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the
agreed-upon purchase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in
whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any
of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs,
or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or
regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal
services.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if-
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fidu-
ciary representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or in-
terest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the profes-
sional judgment of a lawyer.4 7
The formulation of the Model Rules began with the crea-
tion of the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards (Kutak Commission).48 During the drafting of the
Model Rules, the Kutak Commission considered and rejected
the traditional view that practicing lawyers should be prohib-
District of Columbia, guidelines similar to those contained in Model Rule
5.4(b) & (d) are found in the ethics codes of the 50 states. See Laws. Man. on
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 91:402 (May 18, 1994).
47. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1983) (emphasis
added).
48. See Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moder-
ate Proposals Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383, 384 (1988). This
commission became known as the Kutak Commission, named after its chair
Robert Kutak. See id.
127920001
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ited from entering into business associations with nonlaw-
yers.49 As a result, the Commission's 1981 draft recommended
that the ABA adopt Proposed Rule 5.4, which provided:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial
interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by a non-
lawyer... such as a business corporation, insurance company, legal
services organization or government agency, but only if the terms of
the relationship provide in writing that:
(a) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) information relating to the representation of a client is pro-
tected as required by [the rule on confidentiality of information];
(c) the arrangement does not involve advertising or personal
contract with prospective clients prohibited by [the advertising
and soliciting rules]; and
(d) the arrangement does not result in charging a fee that vio-
lates [the rule on fees]. 50
Proposed Rule 5.4 represented a dramatic departure from
the traditional stance taken earlier by the Canons and the
Model Code.51 As written, Proposed Rule 5.4 would have al-
lowed corporate investment and, thus, nonlawyer control of law
firms. Indeed, it would have opened the door for law firms to
"go public." In light of traditional thinking, it is no surprise
that this proposed rule was the only rule from the 1982 final
draft that was rejected in its entirety and rewritten by the
House of Delegates.52
The Kutak Commission justified its rejection of the tradi-
tional approach in both the Comment and Legal Background
sections which accompanied the final draft of its Proposed Rule
49. See id.
50. STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 299-300 (1998).
51. The Comment and Notes accompanying the Proposed Rule 5.4 ration-
alized this departure from traditional prohibitions on forming partnerships or
sharing fees with nonlawyers by noting the changes in the practice of law over
time. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 48, at 386. The Commission noted
that law firms no longer consist solely of lawyers. See id. Law firms rely in-
creasingly on paralegals and professionals from other fields to manage various
aspects of the firm. See id. Additionally, many lawyers work in organizations
other than law firms, such as government agencies, private corporations, and
public defender and group legal service organizations. See id. Nonlawyers
often direct the work of attorneys in these organizations. See id. In fact, the
ABA specifically discussed the role of nonlawyers in supervising the board of
directors of a legal services association in a formal opinion. See ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 324 (1970).
52. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 50, at 300.
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5.4.53 The Legal Background section, in particular, was highly
critical of the traditional approach:
To prohibit all intermediary arrangements is to assume that the
lawyer's professional judgment is impeded by the fact of being em-
ployed by a lay organization .... The assumed equivalence between
employment and interference with the lawyer's professional judgment
is at best tenuous .... Applications of unauthorized practice princi-
ples, only tenuously related to substantial ethical concerns raised by
intermediary relationships, may be viewed as economic protectionism
for traditional legal service organizations ....
The exceptions to per se prohibitions on legal service arrange-
ments involving non-lawyers have substantially eroded the general
rule, leading to inconsistent treatment of various methods of organi-
zation on the basis of form or sponsorship. Adherence to the tradi-
tional prohibitions has impeded development of new methods of pro-
viding legal services.'
Similarly, the comment to Proposed Rule 5.4 noted that
"[gliven the complex variety of modem legal services, it is im-
practical to define organizational forms that uniquely can
guarantee compliance with the Rules of Professional Con-
duct."55
Apparently, the ABA House of Delegates saw things differ-
ently. In February 1983, the Kutak Commission's Proposed
Rule 5.4 became the subject of debate at a House of Delegates
meeting.56 The proponents of the Rule met strong opposition
from the General Practice Section. 57 Earlier, the General Prac-
tice Section had submitted an amendment to Proposed Rule 5.4
which essentially continued the traditional prohibitions against
sharing fees and forming business associations with nonlaw-
53. See Andrews, supra note 23, at 594.
54. COMMISION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS,
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT: AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 177, 178 (1981), quoted in An-
drews, supra note 23, at 594-95.
55. 107 REP. A.B.A. 887 (1982). The Kutak Commission included a listing
of the different legal services organizations:
[Miultimember partnerships, firms employing paraprofessionals and
professionals of other disciplines, professional corporations, insurance
companies that employ counsel who represent insureds, law depart-
ments of private organizations and government agencies, legal service
agencies and defender organizations, and group legal service organi-
zations in which nonlawyers, or lawyers acting in a managerial ca-
pacity, may be directors or have managerial responsibility.
Id.
56. See Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 48, at 391.
57. See id. at 392.
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yers.5 8 Those opposing the Kutak Commission's version of the
rule asserted several grounds for their opposition.5 9 First, the
Commission's proposal would permit Sears, Roebuck & Co., H
& R Block, or Big Eight accounting firms to open law offices
which would compete with traditional law firms.60 Second,
nonlawyer ownership of law firms would interfere with the pro-
fessional independence of lawyers. 61 Third, nonlawyer owner-
ship would result in economic pressures that undermine the
professionalism of law.6 2 Finally, opponents to the Proposed
Rule stated that the such a rule could dramatically alter, in un-
foreseeable ways, the structure of the legal profession.6 3 Ac-
58. See id at 391-92.
59. See Andrews, supra note 23, at 595.
60. See id. During the debate, a member opposing the Kutak Commis-
sion's proposed rule admonished: "You each have a constituency. How will you
explain to the sole practitioner who finds himself in competition with Sears
why you voted for this? How will you explain to the man in the mid-size firm
who is being put out of business by the big eight law [sic] firms? How will you
explain that?" Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Session 48
(Feb. 8, 1983) (statement of Al Conant), quoted in Andrews, supra note 23, at
595 n.107.
61. See Andrews, supra note 23, at 595. Another opponent had stated:
I cannot conceive that a lawyer can maintain his independence and
his independent judgment over a period of time when he's on a salary
from a corporation that's looking over his shoulder at his results in
terms of profit. Now if you wish to destroy our profession as we've
known it... if you want to destroy it, the young lawyer's opportuni-
ties in this country to enjoy the same professional independence that
you and I have known, then ... support the Commission.
Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Session 46-47 (Feb. 8, 1983)
(statement of Bob Hawkins), quoted in Andrews, supra note 23, at 595 n.108.
62. See Andrews, supra note 23, at 595. Another opponent inquired:
Is it cost-effect[ive] to provide full representation? Is it cost-effective
to zealously represent your client? Is it cost-effective to spend enough
time with your client to get the job properly done? I think the answer
is no. But clearly as lawyers, as professionals, we must get the job
done properly, and we must spend that time and we must do those
things. But what about the business venturer who owns this firm, he
who hires or fires the lawyers? They needn't view it that way. Now if
the safeguards of the Commission were adequate... fine. But [they]
won't be, and I submit who is in trouble if there is a violation of these
rules? Is it the venturer or the lawyer? It's the lawyer; the venturer
isn't even under the jurisdiction.
Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Session 41-42 (Feb. 8, 1983)
(statement of Charles Kettlewell), quoted in Andrews, supra note 23, at 595
n.109.
63. No one can tell you what the impact of Rule 5.4 is going to be on
the legal profession, but everyone can assure you, and you can assure
yourself merely by reading it, that it is going to have a major impact
and mark a fundamental change in the practice of law.
Unedited Transcript of ABA House of Delegates Session 37-38 (Feb. 8, 1983)
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cording to Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., the debate wound
down quickly after he responded "yes" to the question: "Does
this rule mean that Sears, Roebuck will be able to open a law
office?" 64 In the end, the General Practice Section's traditional
view carried the day, and the Kutak Commission's Proposed
Rule 5.4 was rejected.65
As it turns out then, current Model Rule 5.4(a) prohibits a
lawyer from sharing fees with a nonlawyer, except for ex-
tremely limited cases.66 Rule 5.4(b) prohibits the formation of a
partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the
partnership consist of the "practice of law."6 7 And Rule 5.4(d)
prohibits a lawyer from practicing in a professional corporation
or association if a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer or
has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of
the lawyer.68 Therefore, Model Rule 5.4, while allowing lawyer-
nonlawyer cooperation in the responsible representation of a
client, does not permit "multidisciplinary practice" as contem-
plated by the tradition of ABA regulations.69
4. The District of Columbia Rule
One jurisdiction in the United States, the District of Co-
lumbia, has adopted a version of Rule 5.4 which permits a law-
yer's partnership and fee sharing with nonlawyers. The D.C.
rule provides, in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer,
except that:
(4) Sharing of fees is permitted in a partnership or other form of
organization which meets the requirements of paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of or-
ganization in which a financial interest is held or managerial author-
ity is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs professional
services which assist the organization in providing legal services to
clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose pro-
viding legal services to clients;
(statement of Al Conant), quoted in Andrews, supra note 23, at 596 n.110.
64. Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 48, at 392.
65. See id.
66. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a) (1983).
67. Id. Rule 5.4(b).
68. Id. Rule 5.4(d).
69. See supra note 2 (defining the term "multidisciplinary practice").
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(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a fi-
nancial interest undertake to abide by these Rules of Professional
Conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial
authority in the partnership or organization undertake to be re-
sponsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent as if
nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1.
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.70
While the D.C. rule does differ in strength and coverage from
Model Rule 5.4, it does not remove all prohibitions concerning
MDPs, but rather provides some restrictions as to lawyer-
nonlawyer partnerships and fee sharing. For example, the D.C.
rule would not permit an accountant and a lawyer to enter into
a partnership or share legal fees if a purpose of the partnership
is to provide nonlegal services. 71
C. FEEBLE ATTEMPTs To SURVIVE IN THE CURRENT
ENVIRONMENT
Modern law firms are run as businesses, and these busi-
nesses must find ways to meet the needs of clients. In response
to the expansion of professional services firms and the restric-
tions of the Model Code, some law firms have established sepa-
rate "ancillary businesses" in which lawyers and nonlawyer
partners provide professional services to clients. 72 An example
of such an arrangement is where a law firm and a Big Five ac-
counting firm cooperate to share clients and serve each other's
professional needs. 73 These service-structures, since designed
to deliver nonlegal services, are not affected by the prohibitions
on partnerships and fee sharing with nonlawyers.7 4 But critics
charge that these ancillary businesses-as one might have ex-
pected-are approaching, if they have not already met, the
definition of "prohibited activities" under the Model Code. 75
While some defenders and advocates of these ancillary business
70. D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1990).
71. See American Bar Association, Background Paper on Multidisciplin-
ary Practice: Issues and Developments, PROF. LAW., Fall 1998, at 7, 7. The
rules do not permit an individual or entity to acquire all or any part of the
ownership of a law partnership or other form of law practice organization for
investment or other purposes. See id.
72. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 18.
73. See id.
74. See id; see also supra Part II.B. (discussing the scheme of regulation).
75. See generally Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Profes-
sionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L.
REV. 363 (1993).
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arrangements argued that the arrangements did not violate the
text of the Model Code, others argued just as forcefully that the
spirit of the Model Code had been violated, if not its letter.7 6
The ABA House of Delegates, after much discussion and de-
bate, finally tackled the issue with the adoption of a rule which
made all lawyers providing "law-related" services subject to the
Model Rules. 7
Those lawyers and firms particularly frustrated by the
Model Code's prohibitions on MDPs attempted to find a solu-
tion to the prohibitions by creating patchwork relationships
with other professionals. In so doing, however, these "solu-
tions" have not reduced the sparring over MDP-related issues.
78
Ancillary businesses not only face ethics-related challenges in
the ABA, but they face competitive disadvantages in the raising
of capital and other elements of business.7 9 The ABA, perhaps
tired and frustrated with the debate, decided to establish a spe-
cial commission to examine MDPs.
III. THE ABA COMMISSION (AND REPORT) ON
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE
In 1998, the American Bar Association established its
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to examine the issue
of MDPs and deliver a recommendation.80 The Commission
was to report on the extent of the encroachment into the legal
profession by other professionals; the potential impact of MDPs
on the legal profession; and possible modifications to current
ethical rules and principles.8'
Over a ten-month period, the Commission sought opinions
from the public, from bar regulators, from lawyers, and from
interests both national and international.8 2 In February 1999,
the Commission submitted a study containing background in-
formation on MDPs to the ABA House of Delegates.8 3 That
same month, the Commission forwarded a second paper to the
76. See REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 18.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. Between September 1998 and June 1999, the Commission conducted
extensive hearings. Fifty-six witnesses testified before the Commission, and
other interested persons submitted written comments. See id.
83. See BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 3.
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House of Delegates describing possible models of multidisci-
plinary practice.8 4
A. THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATION
After further deliberations and study, the Commission
submitted a Report and Recommendation to the House of Dele-
gates. 85 The Commission recommended a "relaxation of the
prohibitions against sharing legal fees and forming a partner-
ship or other association with a nonlawyer when one of the ac-
tivities is the practice of law."86 Among the specific items of
recommendation were these:
" "A lawyer should be permitted to share legal fees
with a nonlawyer [within a MDP], subject to certain
safeguards that prevent erosion of the core values of
the legal profession."87
* "A lawyer should be permitted to deliver legal serv-
ices through a multidisciplinary practice (MDP)...
that includes lawyers and nonlawyers and has as
one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal
services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or
that holds itself out to the public as providing nonle-
gal, as well as legal, services."88
* "All rules of professional conduct that apply to a law
firm should also apply to an MDP."8 9
* MDPs controlled by nonlawyers would be required to
sign and deliver a statement to the highest regula-
tory body in the MDP's jurisdiction. The statement
would hold, in part, that the MDP will not "interfere
with a lawyer's exercise of independent professional
judgment on behalf of a client;" will "establish, main-
tain and enforce procedures designed to protect a
lawyer's exercise of independent professional judg-
ment;" will "establish, maintain and enforce proce-
84. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDIScIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, HYPOTHETICALS AND MODELS (1999), available at <httpJ/www.
abanet.org/cpr/multicomhypos.html>.
85. See REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 18.
86. Id.
87. COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE REPORT, AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, RECOMMENDATION Recommendation 2, available at <http'J/www.
abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommendation.html> [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION].
88. Id. Recommendation 3.
89. Id. Recommendation 7.
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dures to protect a lawyer's professional obligation to
segregate client funds;" and will "respect the unique
role of the lawyer in society as an officer of the legal
system, a representative of clients and a public citi-
zen having special responsibility for the administra-
tion ofjustice."9
The Commission Report does often qualify these Recom-
mendations 9' and it should be noted that its first item for rec-
ommendation includes this proposal: "The legal profession
should adopt and maintain rules of professional conduct that
protect its core values, independence of professional judgment,
protection of confidential client information, and loyalty to the
client through avoidance of conflicts of interest, but [should al-
low MDPs]."92 Finally, it must be noted that the Commission
asked the ABA House of Delegates to approve only the Recom-
mendation, and not the proposed rules, amendments, or com-
mentary accompanying the Recommendation. 93
B. REACTIONS TO THE COMMISSION AND REPORT
At its August 1999 annual meeting, the ABA postponed a
vote on the proposal to permit fee sharing between lawyers and
other professionals.9 4 Amid growing concern that it was mov-
ing too quickly on the issue, the ABA's House of Delegates
agreed to delay a vote at least until it meets this year, allowing
time for further study on the issue.95 There was little doubt
among delegates that had there been a vote on the proposal it
would have been defeated. 96
A few influential state bar associations, in a preemptive
strike against pro-MDP forces, have already passed resolutions
against the acceptance of MDPs.97 The bulk of the opposition
90. Id. Recommendations 14, 15.
91. See, e.g., id. Recommendation 4 ("Nonlawyers in an MI)P, or other-
wise, should not be permitted to deliver legal services.").
92. Id. Recommendation 1.
93. See APPENDIX A, supra note 2. As a complement to the Report sup-
porting the Recommendation, the Commission offered a draft Model Rule 5.8.
See id. It also suggested corresponding amendments to other Model Rules
consistent with the Recommendation. See id.
94. See Margaret A. Jacobs, ABA Puts Off Vote on Nonlawyer Partner-
ships, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1999, at B9.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Rocco Cammarere, Multidisciplinary Practices: Gone, But
Not Forgotten, N.J. LAW. Aug. 16, 1999, at 4 (New Jersey); Gary Spencer, Bar
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focuses on the fee-sharing element of MDP-reform. The New
York State Bar Association (NYBA), for instance, has been one
of the most persistent voices against MDPs and the Commis-
sion's recommendation. The NYBA, while leading the opposi-
tion to the Commission's Recommendation, emphasized that it
might accept a recommendation after more time for study and
reflection. The NYBA states that it "opposes any changes in
existing regulations prohibiting attorneys from practicing law
in MDPs, in the absence of a sufficient demonstration that such
changes are in the best interest of clients and society and do
not undermine or dilute the integrity of the delivery of legal
services by the legal profession."98 It is important to note that
any proposal eventually approved by the ABA would still have
to be adopted by the states, where local bar associations are ei-
ther opposing the broad notion of MDP-reform or have yet to
formally study the issue.
A prominent international law association (Union Interna-
tionale des Avocats) welcomed the news of the Commission and
its recommendations. Attempting to create further interna-
tional support for MDPs, the group proposed universal ethics
rules which could serve as model rules for both those nations
favoring MDPs and those nations currently wrestling with the
issue.99
The accounting profession has generally hailed the Com-
mission's recommendations as a positive development, and
looks forward to the "merging" of the two professions.' °° Big
Five accounting firms want the legal professions for two main
reasons: one, accounting firms will not have to worry about
strong, organized opposition to their recent growth, and coop-
eration between the professions-while allowing law firms to
regain some" of the market-will also allow accounting firms to
further increase their overall "one-stop shopping" lead in the
marketplace.101
Opposes Non-Lawyers Sharing Fees, N.Y. L.J., June 29, 1999, at 1 (New York);
Ticker, NATL L.J., Aug. 16, 1999, at A4 (Pennsylvania).
98. Spencer, supra note 97, at 1.
99. See Darryl Van Duch, MDPs Get International Support, NAT'L L.J.,
July 12, 1999, at A4.
100. ABA Urges One-Stop Shopping, supra note 4, at 16.
101. See id.
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C. CoMMENTARY: THE COMMISSION'S METHOD OF DECISION-
MAKING
The Commission was comprised of various experts from
around the country, and it engaged in serious research and
study of the issue of MDPs. With that said, the Commission
did create certain documents for public release and examina-
tion. It is a review of those documents, and those documents
only, that provide the basis for the following comments.
1. Not "If' but "How": The Commission's Peculiar Bent
The Commission seemed to divide its decision into two
broad issues: whether the prohibitions on MDPs should be re-
laxed and, if so, how the profession's values could be protected
through new rules and amendments.10 2 Another way to phrase
this division is to say that the Commission initially considered
what might be called business-related interests, and only then
addressed ethics-related interests. After deciding MDPs were
generally favorable vehicles for legal services, the Commission
crafted proposals designed to protect critical aspects of the pro-
fession and the attorney-client relationship. The Commission's
division of issues is in itself reasonable, but the order of consid-
eration and the implied relationship between the issues deserve
further examination.
The Commission, in determining whether MDPs should be
allowed, could have adopted any one of many decision-making
methods. One would have expected the Commission to use one
of the following methods:
(1) Determine whether MDPs would place a burden on the
profession's core values; if so, recommend a maintenance of the
regulations or a strengthening of them, without further exami-
nation or balancing of interests. 0 3
(2) Determine whether MDPs would place a burden on the
profession's core values; if so, determine if MDPs would bring
economic benefit to lawyers and their clients; if so, conduct a
balancing test of economic benefit versus harm to core values to
102. See REPORTERS NOTES, supra note 18.
103. An obvious corollary to this method is to determine if MDPs would
bring economic benefit to lawyers and their clients. If so, recommend a relaxa-
tion of regulations with no further examination or balancing of interests. But
most would have considered this to be an outrageous method and so it fell out-
side the range of practical possibilities.
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see if MDPs might be allowed with an acceptable risk of harm
to the core values.
(3) Determine whether MDPs would bring economic benefit
to lawyers and their clients; if so, consider whether MDPs place
a burden on the profession's core values; if so, conduct a bal-
ancing tests of economic benefit versus harm to core values to
see if MDPs might be allowed with an acceptable risk.
As most observers would expect the Commission to employ
one of these methods, many would be surprised to learn that
the Commission did not use any of them. The first method-
core values as sole criterion-was not used, if at all considered,
by the Commission. It surely could have been implemented, for
many lawyers would argue that no interest can supercede the
protection of the profession's core values. But the method was
clearly not used: a brief survey of the Recommendation and the
Report shows that the Commission was very interested in other
factors besides potential harm to the core values of the profes-
sion.
Neither did the Commission seem to use the second or
third methods. The consideration of both the core values and
business benefits (beginning with one or the other), combined
with a balancing test, was not put in practice by the Commis-
sion. Note here that the Commission did hear testimony about,
discuss, and analyze information concerning both business and
ethics; with that conclusion no observer would disagree. But it
seems that the Commission did not put into effect a serious
balancing test of concerns before deciding that the Model Rules
should be relaxed for MDPs.
Only after deciding that various interests (e.g., clients,
consumer groups, etc.) dictated a change in MDP regulations
did the Commission contemplate new rules which would best
counter new ethical problems for the profession. 1°4 There are
two noteworthy issues here. First, the Commission did not
seem to consider MDPs' effects on the ethics of the profession
as the primary factor in deciding whether MDPs should be al-
lowed; rather, safeguarding the ethics of the profession seems
to have been a sort of post hoc consideration. Second, a related
but distinct point: the Commission-in deciding how to reform
104. The Commission says that its purpose was to "determine what
changes, if any, should be made" to the Model Rules. REPORT, supra note 2.
The wording of this description seems to suggest the Commission's response;
changes will be made.
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the Model Rules-apparently accepted the notion that MDPs
will bring new and dangerous problems for the profession.
In an explanation of its decision-making process, the
Commission's notes read: "Having heard the persuasive testi-
mony from business clients, representatives of consumer
groups, and ABA entities in support of a relaxation of Model
Rule 5.4, the Commission proceeded to examine how to pre-
serve the core values of the legal profession.., in an MDP set-
ting."05 Disregarding unintended mistakes in writing and con-
sequent meaning, it appears that the Commission first decided
that MDPs should be allowed as proper vehicles for the distri-
bution of legal services, and later considered how to protect the
profession from negative effects.106 Some might argue that this
is not an especially important point. Whether the Commission
balanced both issues and then made a decision involving
changes to the rules, or whether the Commission made a deci-
sion based on one issue, and then proposed changes to the rules
as compensation for the other issue, is not a critical difference,
they would argue. But the difference may be a telling one, at
least for consideration of the Commission's broad perspective
and motivation. 10 7 Examination of a closely-related point might
better reveal the Commission's perspective.
The Commission, after deciding that MDPs should be al-
lowed, examined the issue of protecting the core values of the
profession, and decided that "these core values were best pro-
tected by recommending a special set of regulatory undertak-
ings to govern the MDP[s]" and the lawyers in them.08 The
Commission's use of language in its description of the decision-
making process is interesting. Not only does the Commission
recognize that MDPs would present problems for the core val-
ues of the profession, but its description ("best protected")
105. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 18.
106. "Having heard" does not merely denote the hearing of testimony on
the issue. These words and their context imply both hearings and a subse-
quent decision in favor of MDPs.
107. Here is an analogy related to federal law-making. Assume that Con-
gress decides-based on studies showing that permit-to-carry statutes reduce
violent crime-to liberalize gun-ownership laws. Congress then considers how
to "best protect" citizens from the negative effects of its legislation. While
some could argue that the result (the legislation) would most likely be the
same regardless of the path to it, the particular path chosen would reveal
Congress's broad perspective on the issue of gun-ownership. In this example,
the good of gun-ownership carries with it a weight not shared by other con-
cerns.
108. REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 18 (emphasis added).
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seems to admit that even the recommendation of a new regula-
tory system would not fully counter these problems. Other-
wise, why use the language of "best protected" instead of the
obvious alternative term "protected"?10 9 The only answer can
be that the Commission is concerned that the problems posed
by MDPs will not be neutralized by its Recommendation. So
why, some lawyers and others will ask, did the Commission
recommend that the ABA accept MDPs?
That question brings us back to the methodology employed
by the Commission in making its decision. The Commission
seems to have been primarily interested in whether MDPs
would bring some stability to the competition between law
firms and nonlegal firms in the professional services market.
In gathering evidence about nonlegal firms' threatening en-
croachment into legal services, lawyers' demands for MDPs,
and clients' interest in MDPs, the Commission apparently came
to a firm decision-lawyers and law firms need MDPs to com-
pete in the marketplace, so the Commission must recommend
that MDPs be allowed. After making that decision, the Com-
mission then turned to what can only be described as its secon-
dary issue-how to restructure the Model Rules so that MDPs
do not cause unnecessary damage to the profession.
This methodology does not clearly contradict the Commis-
sion's formal Recommendation, 110 but there does appear to be
significant conflict. The first recommendation, as its place in
the list would suggest, was most likely meant to be the general
guide for the remainder."' This recommendation points out
that there are two different, though not necessarily opposed, in-
terests to consider: first, the core values of the profession and,
second, the development of MIDPs. 112 The recommendation
stresses that the profession "should adopt and maintain rules
of professional conduct that protect its core values," but "should
not permit existing rules to unnecessarily inhibit the develop-
ment of [MDPs]. " 113 This diplomatic recommendation offers a
109. Here the Commission is describing its reaction to the problems pre-
sented by MDPs. The term "best" seems to necessarily imply these problems
are not expected to be fully solved by the recommended protections.
110. See RECOMMENDATION, supra note 87, Recommendation 1.
111. See id.; see also REPORT, supra note 2 (stating that the core values
were the Commission's overriding interest).
112. See RECOMMENDATION, supra note 87, Recommendation 1. The order
of the interests' consideration seems opposite of the method actually used by
the Commission.
113. Id.
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confusing message to its readers. The key phrase in this rec-
ommendation for understanding the relationship between core
values and MDPs is of course the "unnecessarily inhibit" lan-
guage." 4
Whether one believes that there is unnecessary inhibition
of MDPs posed by the Rules of Professional Conduct depends
on the value one places on the various concerns involved. If, for
instance, the current regulations went beyond protecting the
profession to the level of interfering with business, without
giving further protection to the core values, there clearly would
be "unnecessary inhibition." But this is not the case here, at
least from the perspective of the Commission. The Commission
tells us elsewhere that the relaxation of the current regulations
will indeed pose dangers to the profession's core values, and
that the recommended protections against these dangers might
not succeed. 115 Despite its own, albeit quiet, warning about
MDPs, however, the Commission saw the current regulations
as an "unnecessary inhibition" of MDPs. Here, then, the Com-
mission's perspective must be one of placing primary emphasis
on the business interests of lawyers and their clients, and giv-
ing secondary consideration to the profession's core values.
2. The Commission's Concept of the Legal Profession:
Business or Law?
Market factors are certainly an important consideration for
a profession, but given the legal profession's special position in
civilized society, there are clearly other interests to consider.
The legal profession has a right to look after its interests as a
group in the professional services market, but it also has a duty
to do its best to safeguard the integrity of the provision of legal
services. The dual nature of the legal profession-both busi-
ness for profit and arm of the judicial system-raises an obvi-
ous but perhaps overlooked question: What was the purpose of
the Commission?
The opponents of MDP are sometimes referred to as having
mere "protectionist" concerns.15 These opponents are faulted
for stressing too strongly exclusionary business interests and
for not having a concern for the larger picture of the legal pro-
114. Id. This language brings up the balancing test idea mentioned earlier.
115. See REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 18.
116. Richard A. Abel, Transnational Law Practice, 44 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 737, 739-41 (1994).
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fession's purpose. 117 That is, those favoring MDPs might com-
plain that anti-MDP forces are mistaken in treating the legal
profession as any other profession. This characterization may
or may not be true, but the criticism is an interesting one, for
the same (or a very similar) charge can be leveled against the
Commission and the rest of those favoring MDP. The Commis-
sion's attention to the business interests of the profession did
not lead, as some might expect, to the opposition of MDP, but
rather to the energetic advocacy of it.
The Commission devoted a great deal of its Report to ex-
pressing concern about the protection and expansion of busi-
ness interests for lawyers. 118 The issues of clients' desires and
the competition's recent activity do not seem to complement the
Commission's other interests, but seem to dominate the discus-
sion. The point here is not to condemn the Commission for be-
ing interested in the business of lawyering, but to ascertain the
correct perspective one should have in reading the Commis-
sion's analysis and conclusion. For instance, the group "United
Federation of Car Dealers" might establish a commission to in-
vestigate the phenomenon of internet sales, and then release a
detailed report. All readers of that report would guess that the
car dealers are interested in protecting their current position in
the marketplace. But few would assume that the "UFCD" was
strongly concerned with unethical sales practices, or the gen-
eral protection of the buyer's interests. This is perhaps an ex-
treme example of the point, but it sufficiently presents the
problem of the Report's reception.
3. The Absence of Consideration of an Obvious Alternative
The Commission's Report states that its purpose was to
"determine what changes, if any, should be made" to the Model
Rules.'1 9 As has already been pointed out, the Commission de-
termined that the business interests of lawyers and their cli-
ents demanded a relaxation of the current regulations, and
then the Commission decided exactly what changes should be
recommended. In making this determination, the Commission
seemed to rely on the threat from nonlegal firms as background
for discussion. The conclusion of the Commission, although un-
117. See id. at 741-45.
118. The Commission's voiced concerns in this area are comparable to
those expected from any corporate board in a strategy meeting.
119. REPORT, supra note 2.
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stated, was that unless the current regulations are relaxed,
these nonlegal firms will so advance their encroachment on the
MDP market that the legal profession will become severely
crippled.
While this conclusion on the part of the Commission is rea-
sonable, it lacks force because of the Commission's limited dis-
cussion. Critics of the Commission will say that the Commis-
sion appears to have ignored an obvious alternative
recommendation. Assuming that the threat from nonlegal
firms is a very real and serious one, and that this threat
prompted the formation of the Commission, it is odd that the
Commission would not consider all serious responses to this
threat. The Commission decided that changes to the Model
Rules were necessary, but forgot to consider the possibility of
strengthening them.
In its various discussions, the Commission cites three
broad reasons for implementing the relaxation of the Model
Rules: the threat from nonlegal firms, demand from lawyers'
clients, and demand from lawyers themselves.1 20  But it is
probable, if not certain, that the first of these reasons (the
nonlegal MDP threat) is a strong influence on, or the very
cause of, the second and third reasons. If this first reason can
be countered, perhaps the second and third would largely dis-
appear. That is, the existence of nonlegal firms, both in Europe
and the United States, has caught the attention of law firms
and the clients of those law firms. The law firms demand the
freedom to reach the same markets that the nonlegal firms are
now reaching. The clients notice the disparity between nonle-
gal firms and those law firms with which they currently do
business, and they demand the convenience exhibited in the
nonlegal firm's structure. The motivations of these law firms
and their clients are perhaps a bit different-the law firm
might be interested in self-preservation or growth opportunity
while the clients are interested in mere convenience. But the
cause of both demands may very well be the same-the nonle-
gal firm's expansion into legal markets.
Again, assuming that the nonlegal firm is a serious threat,
there are only two reasonable responses-strengthen the divi-
sion between lawyers and nonlawyers or weaken that division.
The Commission obviously decided that the latter course was
most appropriate, and that may simply be a function of market
120. See id.
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realities. The Commission proposed allowing lawyers the same
flexibility which nonlawyers have had for some time. It is
readily imaginable that the other possibility-strengthening
the division-would prove to be a poor choice after it is thor-
oughly discussed and debated. But why was it not given atten-
tion by the Commission?
As of right now, certain nonlegal firms are seen as threats
to the legal profession because their nonlawyers are engaged in
what some see as the practice of law, or these firms might em-
ploy lawyers to do the same kind of work while their lawyers
are, essentially, not bound by the regulatory system designed
for lawyers. In either case, it seems that if "the practice of
law," were better defined (from the perspective of the ABA), the
threat from nonlegal firms would subside. This would most
likely be accomplished through the legal community's energetic
lobbying of state and federal officials-a difficult task, given
the average citizen's opinion of lawyers. But the ABA and like-
minded organizations do have political clout, and a well-
designed lobbying effort could not only stem the tide, but soon
end it for good.
The Commission does mention that the term "legal prac-
tice" is difficult to define and thus, those nonlegal firms seen as
"threatening" traditional legal practice are very seldom charged
with the "unauthorized practice of law" when they may be, in
fact, engaging in just that.121 Perhaps the Commission sees
this fight as one which has already been lost. We believe that
even if the battle is not already lost, it nevertheless is not
worth fighting. Still, it is odd that the Commission did not de-
vote significant attention to the alternative of strengthening
the regulations on the activities involving the legal profession
and the practice of law.
D. THE COMMISSION'S UPDATED REPORT
On December 15, 1999, the Commission issued its Updated
Background and Information Report and Request for Com-
ments (Updated Report).122 The stated purposes of the Up-
dated Report were to (1) provide information on developments
since the ABA Annual Meeting in August of 1999, (2) reply to
121. See id.
122. COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
UPDATED BACKGROUND AND INFORMATION REPORT AND REQUEST FOR
COMMENTS (1999), available at <http'//www.abanet.orgcpr/febmdp.html>.
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criticisms of the original Report, and (3) encourage further
dialog. 123
In the first category, the Commission noted that
"[sitrategic and other alliances between law firms and Big Five
accounting firms are becoming increasingly popular."124 The
Commission also commented on the rapidly changing legal
landscape outside of the United States. 125
In responding to criticism of the original report, the Com-
mission focused on nine issues. 126 These ranged from including
competency as a core value in structuring the regulation of
MDPs to whether control of MDPs should be limited to law-
yers. 127 In all of its responses, while the Commission showed
flexibility in its approach, it did not back off its focal point that
the question of not "how," but "if' ultimately "carries enough
weight to [permit] a relaxation of the present prohibitions on
fee sharing and partnership with nonlawyers."128
In the final section of the Updated Report, the Commission
made several interesting comments. For the first time the
Commission invited comments on whether "stepped-up en-
forcement of [unauthorized practice of law statutes] and related
code of conduct provisions is in the public interest and/or an
achievable objective."129 Then, however, the Commission re-
turned to its primary focus and invited comments on what type
of MDP model should be used, suggesting that variations in-
clude the District of Columbia rule, a contract model allowing
close affiliation of law firms with other professionals, or a fully
integrated MDP model. 130
IV. ARGUMENTS SURROUNDING THE ISSUE OF
MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE
With market factors supporting relaxation of the regula-
tion of lawyers engaging in a multidisciplinary practice, the is-
sue then turns to whether maintenance of the current regula-
tory regime is necessary for the protection of clients and the
integrity of the legal profession. While not attempting to be
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id.
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exhaustive, we will present and comment on the arguments
used by both supporters and opponents of MDPs.
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE
Arguments in favor of MDP are typically based on eco-
nomic considerations. Proponents argue that economic benefits
to the profession and clients demand strong consideration and,
ultimately, a decision to relax the prohibitions against MDPs.
1. Loss of Bargaining Position in the Professional Services
Marketplace
The protection of economic interests, at first glance, seems
natural to an argument opposing MDPs. For example, since
MDPs will allow partnerships with nonlawyers, those opposing
MDPs are sometimes portrayed as economic protectionists for
the legal profession.' 3 ' But economic interests, and perhaps
protectionist interests, are ironically strong forces for those le-
gal factions favoring MDPs, and economic interests are most
likely the motivation for spurring the current debate.
Lawyers are clearly worried about the encroachment on
their profession by accounting firms and other professional
services firms. Some of these firms are focused on directly
giving legal or quasi-legal advice, while other nonlegal firms
hire lawyers from law firms or law schools to accomplish the
same thing. The result is that these nonlegal firms are pro-
viding multidisciplinary services while hiding behind the non-
legal label, and are thus threatening the traditional province of
the law firm. If this trend continues and if the legal profession
does not expand its ability to reach more clientele, the result
will most likely be the diminution of business for lawyers. 132 As
one lawyer put it: "We are all paranoid about driving our cli-
ents into the arms of other professionals and that's one of the
reasons we are [pushing MDP reform]."133
While it perhaps was not to be expected that the Commis-
sion would publicly communicate its fears concerning the loss
of business for lawyers, the Commission was surely motivated,
at least in part, by the market threat to the legal profession.
The Commission did highlight one aspect of economic concern,
131. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 23, at 616-22.
132. See Jacobs, supra note 94, at B9.
133. Elizabeth Davidson, Keeping Clients on a Single Track, LAWYER, Sept.
20, 1999, at 12.
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saying that while there are no precise statistics on accounting
firms' presence in the international legal market, "the evidence
of their emergence as alternative providers is overwhelming." 134
The Commission noted as well that courts have been in-
creasingly reluctant to enforce Unauthorized Practice of Law
(UPL) statutes because the term "practice of law" is vague and
confusing. 35 The Commission's implicit conclusion is clear-
with the growth of nonlawyer firms, and the inability to control
the unauthorized practice of law, the legal profession is facing
severe competition in the relevant marketplace.
2. Convenience of the Client
This is perhaps the most repeated argument from pro-MDP
forces. Proponents of MDPs argue that clients of law firms
have a need-a need growing with the complexity of law and
business-for obtaining multiple professional services from a
single provider. Instead of contacting, visiting, and contracting
with various professional firms, the modern client has a signifi-
cant interest in access to a single firm providing legal, finan-
cial, and other services. 36 Those arguing the "convenience of
client" line of reasoning cite the clear pattern of convenience-
shopping in the marketplace, whether the convenience be the
Mall of America, satellite broadcasting for television, or the
conglomeration of international professional services. 37 This
powerful personality of the market, then, is what drives the le-
gal profession to change-not the mere whims or selfish inter-
ests of legal or nonlegal professionals.
In the first part of its Recommendation, the Commission
proposes relaxing regulations to allow "the development of new
structures for the more effective delivery of services and better
134. REPORTERS NOTES, supra note 18.
135. See id. The Commission mentions that there have been only two re-
cent enforcement actions against the most critical element of nonlawyer com-
petition-Big Five accounting firms. See id.
136. See generally James M. Fischer, Why Can't Lawyers Split Fees? Why
Ask Why, Ask When!, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1992).
137. One advocate for MDPs reasons:
When customers walk into one of my golf stores, I don't sell them a
set of clubs, then send them to four different places for shoes, gloves,
balls and a bag. So why do I have to go to different offices to find
lawyers, accountants, financial planners, insurance agents and public
relations experts?
Michael Paul, Law Firms Shouldn't Be for Lawyers Only, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9,
1999, at A18.
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public access to the legal system."138 The Commission seems to
have found the client convenience argument the most reliable
in recommending a relaxation of MDP regulations. The Com-
mission emphasized: "The opportunity to structure a new vehi-
cle for the delivery of legal services should be available to the
lawyers who express an interest in providing those services to
their clients through an MDP and to those clients who express
an interest in additional choices of legal service providers."1 39
3. Changes Are Dictated by Trends in the Global Economy
In a line of reasoning similar to the "client convenience"
argument, many argue that the legal profession in the United
States must adapt to marketplace competition as it becomes
globalized and remove those regulations that restrict its par-
ticipation. 140 Accounting firms recognized this trend long ago
and already have established a significant toe-hold in the in-
ternational market of MDPs. If the legal profession cannot
adapt to these natural changes in the economy, it will slowly be
pushed aside.141
These larger accounting firms, taking advantage of the pro-
MDP regulatory system overseas, have significant legal prac-
tices throughout Europe, with lawyers on staff or attached to
the accounting firms through some variety of contractual obli-
gations. In some European markets, these accounting firms
are already among the largest providers of legal services for
businesses. And this development is not likely to be curbed by
the legal profession if it does not alter its regulation; the GATT
treaty, which governs most international trade matters, claims
jurisdiction over these professions through the World Trade
Organization-an organization historically biased against
self-interested regulation. 142
While the Commission shied away from examining the po-
tential impact of trade agreements and trade organizations on
MDPs, it did consider the international marketplace to be a
strong challenge to current regulations. 143 The Commission
hinted at the inevitable trend of globalization by examining the
138. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 87, Recommendation 1.
139. REPORT, supra note 2.
140. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, Lawyers Need to Evolve with the Economy, J.
COM., Aug. 13, 1999, at 9, 9.
141. See ABA Urges One-Stop Shopping, supra note 4, at 15.
142. See Gibeaut, supra note 7, at 44.
143. See REPORT, supra note 2.
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developments of pro-MDP proposals and current regulations
around the world, and the participation in these friendly mar-
kets by nonlegal professional firms. 144
4. Access to New Capital
As it stands today, partners, or their shareholder counter-
parts, provide all of the equity financing for law firms, and
while law firms are typically characterized as labor-intensive
rather than capital-intensive, their capital needs are increasing
as technology plays a larger role in the delivery of legal serv-
ices. Furthermore, the notion that because law firms are labor-
intensive they are thus not capital intensive fails to recognize
that many law firms invest significant amounts of money
training and developing young associates. Allowing law firms
access to the equity markets-that is, investment by nonlaw-
yers-is a concomitant of sanctioning MDPs and could result in
law firms that are optimally capitalized and, thus, more effi-
cient.
In short, many law firms could benefit from having access
to the equity markets. The equity markets would provide law
firms with necessary capital for expansion into new geographi-
cal areas, thereby better serving consumers' needs by permit-
ting greater access to legal services and increased competition
in the local marketplace. This newfound capital would also al-
low investment into new technologies, again resulting in better
legal services for the consumer. Assuming law firms are indeed
labor-intensive, law firms train a great percentage of the pro-
fession's future leaders. With greater capital, this task be-
comes more efficient. Moreover, law firms often serve society
best in their ability to take on large and financially risky con-
tingency fee cases. Many of these cases require enormous capi-
tal outlay years before any repayment can be expected. The
capital that firms could raise in the equity markets could assist
in financing these cases, serving plaintiffs who otherwise would
go unrepresented.
B. ARGUMENTS OPPOSING MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE
Opponents of MDP usually argue on the basis of ethical
considerations. They argue that the economic factors involved
are connected to a short-term perspective, and that the profes-
144. See REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 18.
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sion and clients are bound to suffer if MDP prohibitions are
relaxed.
1. Professional Objectivity and Independence Threatened
A primary concern of groups opposing MDPs is the threat
to a lawyer's independent judgment.145 When a lawyer has in-
timate strategic and financial attachments to nonlegal profes-
sionals, so goes the argument, there are bound to be obstacles
to independent judgment. For example, if the lawyer is a part-
ner with a financial planner, and the financial planner has in-
vested a great deal of money and time in creating a plan for a
client, the lawyer might be pressured to give less-than-
independent counsel to the client. As a former president of the
New York State Bar Association had noted, "'[albout half of the
practice of a decent lawyer consists of telling would-be clients
that they are damned fools and should stop.'' 146 This "half' of a
proper practice, say those opposed to MDPs, would be threat-
ened if the current regulations were relaxed.
The Commission recognized this issue as "[tlhe most fre-
quently raised concern" regarding the relaxation of ethics rules.
The Commission pointed out that this is a legitimate concern,
but that MDPs would not create this "problem'-it already ex-
ists:
In today's world, many lawyers routinely work in practice settings in
which they are subject to management oversight by nonlawyers. The
profession has a history of lawyers working in corporate law depart-
ments or government offices. Lawyers also work for organizations
that provide legal services to their members or other clients (e.g. un-
ion-sponsored and prepaid legal services plans, community legal
services organizations). Independence has been maintained in those
settings.
41
As a protection against threats to independent judgment,
however, the Commission recommended that the Model Rules
145. See Cindy Albert Carson, Under New Mismanagement: The Problem of
Non-Lawyer Equity Partnership in Law Firms, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 593,
611-12 (1994). According to Carson, "[a] non-lawyer partner's primary concern
is likely to be a good return on his investment." Id.; see also Norman Bowie,
The Law: From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. REV. 741, 745 (1988)
("The chief characteristic that distinguishes [a business] from a profession is
the motivation of business people. Business people are egoistic; their primary
motivation, according to economic theory, is to maximize their self-interest.").
146. James C. Moore, Lawyer Independence: Being Able to Tell the Client
"You Are a Damned Fool!" N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1999, at 5 (quoting the words of
Elihu Root, former president of the New York State Bar Association).
147. REPORT, supra note 2.
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clearly state that a lawyer supervised by a nonlawyer may not
use as a defense the fact that the lawyer merely complied with
the nonlawyer's resolution of a question of professional duty. 48
In addition, the Commission recommended a requirement that
an MDP not controlled by lawyers must supply to the appropri-
ate regulatory court a written statement that it will not directly
or indirectly interfere with a lawyer's independent judgment on
behalf of a client, and that it will establish and enforce proce-
dures designed to protect a lawyer's exercise of independent
judgment. 149
Moreover, the reality is that law firms are in the business
of providing legal services and can succeed only by providing
sound legal judgment to consumers. Indeed, the value of a firm
would directly reflect the market's perception of the ability of
the firm to render quality, professional legal services. To the
extent that the law firm's reputation is tarnished because it
provides inadequate services, the owners stand to lose. As a
result, nonlawyer investors would be acting to their own detri-
ment by interfering with the professional independence and
judgment of a firm's lawyer-employees and, thus, diminishing
the quality of the legal services offered.
As one commentator noted "it is puzzling that this thesis is
maintained in a society in which the profit motive otherwise is
thought to lead to the production of goods and services for
which there is consumer demand." 50 It seems implausible, for
example, that stockholders of an investment banking firm,
would attempt to interfere, via the board of directors or upper
management, with the professional judgment of the firm's pro-
fessionals.' 51 The perceived quality of that professional judg-
ment is exactly what customers are buying and, ultimately,
what stockholders are counting on for their return on invest-
ment. In short, the dynamics of the marketplace actually mili-
tate against the notion that nonlawyer investors would inter-
fere with the lawyer's professional independence and judgment.
A parallel example of the consumer backlash that this interfer-
ence would spawn can be seen in the changes in attitudes to-
ward managed care over the last several years. Over a decade
148. See RECOMBIENDATION, supra note 87, Recommendation 6.
149. See id. Recommendation 14.
150. Andrews, supra note 23, at 602.
151. This does not mean that other investment banking professionals
might not interfere with a particular individual's professional judgment on a
particular matter.
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ago, doctors began feeling heavy pressures to find quicker,
cheaper methods of caring for patients-often to the patient's
detriment. 152 Presently, however, patients are speaking out
and opposing such nonphysician dictated influences such as
mandatory maximum hospital stays. Patients have begun to
turn the tide in the health care debate and have recast the de-
bate in a different light. 153
Private firms, especially large corporate firms, are equally
concerned with maximizing the bottom line as other nonlegal
businesses. Indeed, "there is no reason to suppose that corpo-
rations or laymen engage in the 'sordid' business of making
money any more than do traditional law firms." 154 Those op-
posing MDPs simply have not demonstrated that "nonlawyer
control is more pernicious, or more efficacious, in interfering
with a lawyer's professional independence, than the control by
supervising or employer attorneys that is allowed currently." 55
Lastly, it must be remembered that the lawyers will con-
tinue to be the persons actually providing legal services and
advice directly to the clients. Practicing in an MDP will no less
remove them from their ethical obligations in rendering serv-
ices than practicing in a large professional corporation as in-
house counsel does now. 156 The ABA has recognized that law-
yers operating under the authority of laymen need not violate
152. George J. Church, Ouch! Ouch! Ouch! This Will Hurt: As Budget Cuts
Loom, Yelps Are Already Being Heard, TIME , Feb. 24, 1986, at 18 (discussing
how hospitals in the mid-1980s were "discharging many Medicare patients
early--'sicker and quicker,' as many doctors put it").
153. See Michael Kramer, Road to the White House, TIME, Fall 1996, at 14
(proposing that one reason President Clinton was able to achieve re-election
after seeing his first term's national health care proposals go down in defeat
was his adoption of proposals such as a bill to mandate a longer hospital stay
after a woman gives birth, an issue that had grown more important as man-
aged health care providers had been discharging women after shorter and
shorter hospital stays).
154. Andrews, supra note 23, at 602.
155. Id. at 607. Andrews also made the following point:
Many lawyers work for a salary as associates for law firms in which
they have no control or ownership interest. Their employers-the
partners or lawyer shareholders-may be looking over the shoulders
of those associates "in terms of profit" just as aggressively as would
nonlawyers offering the services of these same lawyers.
Id. at 606.
156. Model Rule 5.4, which prohibits lawyers from practicing in a profes-
sional corporation if "a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the profes-
sional judgment of a lawyer," need not be changed to allow law firms to go
public. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(d)(3) (1983).
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the Model Rules. For example, in 1970, the ABA issued an
ethics opinion regarding the scope of authority which may be
exercised by the board of directors of a legal aid society.157 In
light of these factors, those considering change should not be
persuaded by the argument that allowing MDPs would inevita-
bly result in interference with the professional judgment of
lawyers. 58
2. Client Confidentiality at Risk
Some argue that the closer integration between lawyers
and other professionals will bring numerous violations of ethics
rules and jeopardize client interests. Nonlegal professionals
157. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 324 (1970). The
Opinion laid out principles to govern the relationship between the board of di-
rectors of the Legal Aid Society and the society's staff attorneys:
(1) The board's functions are limited to formulating broad goals
and policies pertaining to the operation of the society.
(2) To this end, the board may establish guidelines respecting the
categories or kinds of clients staff attorneys may represent and the
types of cases they may handle.
(4) Staff attorneys should endeavor at all times to fulfill the
broad policies formulated by the board and should insure that their
conduct in representing clients or causes is in conformity with the
[applicable ethical standards].
(6) Once the attorney has accepted a client or case of the nature
and type sanctioned by board policy, the board must take special pre-
cautions not to interfere with its attorney's independent professional
judgment in the handling of the matter.
Id.
The Committee believed that these principles would be sufficient to guide
the lawyers and the board of directors in their relationships with each other
and with clients. See id. Those legal aid societies following these principles
would receive the blessings of the ABA. See id. The opinion was issued while
the Code of Professional Responsibility was the most recent set of rules issued
by the ABA, but the substance of the opinion has not been overruled. The
ABA Center for Professional Responsibility noted that Rule 5.4(d) of the Model
Rules does not apply to nonprofit organizations. See ABA CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 460 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES].
158. In any event, a law firm wishing to issue stock to the public could
state in its prospectus, as Steven Brill suggests, that "maximizing shareholder
return is not the firm's sole goal or even its constant priority-and then let the
marketplace decide if the shares are a good buy." Steven Brill, Psst-Wanna
Buy a Hot Stock?, AM. LAW., Nov. 1987, at 3, 102. Brill also suggests that
lawyers could retain "a separate, voting-dominant class of insider stock for the
senior practicing lawyers" to avoid any potential interference from nonlaw-
yers. Id.
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are not bound by the same obligations which bind lawyers, and
in some cases, are positively bound by potentially conflicting
obligations. 159 For example, in the case of an MDP involving
accountants and lawyers, there is a ready-made conflict of in-
terests. Federal securities laws require accountants to disclose
audit irregularities to the Securities and Exchange Commission
if a company does not quickly correct the problems. By con-
trast, lawyers are bound by their ethics rules to maintain client
confidentiality and to regard as privileged all information they
learn from clients.160
Of course, holding "inviolate [the] confidential information
of the client not only facilitates the full development of facts es-
sential to proper representation of the client but also encour-
ages people to seek early legal assistance."161 Only under the
guarantee of confidentiality will clients seek this assistance
and then communicate fully and frankly with their lawyers. 62
The Commission agreed that confidentiality is a serious
concern, since professions have different confidentiality stan-
dards. The Commission recommended that no change be made
to the lawyer's obligation to protect confidential client informa-
tion and proposed several safeguards to protect against poten-
tial conflicts. 63 The recommendations made by the Commis-
sion include the following: applying to MDPs all rules of
professional conduct that would apply to law firms;'6 treating
all clients of an MDP receiving legal services as the lawyer's
clients for purposes of conflicts of interest and imputation in
the same manner as if the MDP were a law firm and all em-
ployees, partners, shareholders or the like were lawyers;165 re-
quiring a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
client sufficiently understands that the lawyer and nonlawyer
may have different obligations with respect to disclosure of cli-
ent information and that the courts may treat the client's com-
munications to the lawyer and nonlawyer differently.166
Moreover, even without these recommended changes, con-
cerns regarding the sanctity of client confidentiality would not
159. See Jacobs, supra note 94, at B9.
160. See REPORT, supra note 2.
161. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 2 (1983).
162. See id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 4.
163. See REPORT, supra note 2.
164. See RECOMMENDATION, supra note 87, Recommendation 7.
165. See id. Recommendation 8.
166. See id. Recommendation 9.
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be well placed. Model Rule 5.3 specifically addresses this ar-
gument, providing that:
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated
with a lawyer:
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that
would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in
by a lawyer if-
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved[.]j6 7
Rule 5.3 would continue to deter lawyers in MDPs from
breaching client confidentiality. In the current everyday real-
ity, nonlawyer employees are necessarily privy to confidential
client information in law firms across the country. In addition,
countless nonlawyer professionals, retained by lawyers for ex-
pert help, have access to client confidences. Despite these
nonlawyers' knowledge of client matters, law firms have not
been plagued by nonlawyers breaking client confidences."
Even assuming that a nonlawyer manager may be able to
access confidential client information, one commentator has
pointed out that "even if nonlawyers do not have as broad a
duty of confidentiality under traditional agency rules as is im-
posed under the lawyer ethics codes, nonlawyer professionals
are free to agree to a broader duty of confidentiality as a con-
tractual matter."168 More convincingly, any breach of confiden-
tiality by a nonlawyer would be to the great detriment of the
firm itself. In the investment banking business, for example,
maintaining client confidences is of paramount importance. 169
For this reason, almost all professional services agreements be-
tween investment banks and their clients include a strict confi-
dentiality clause, binding all employees from the mail person to
the highest managing director. 170 There is no reason why such
agreements could not be made as a matter of course between
MDPs and their clients. Finally, the ABA opinion regarding
167. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3 (1983).
168. Andrews, supra note 23, at 615-16.
169. For example, an untimely leak of a planned takeover offer could cost
the bidding client millions of dollars if the market value of the target stock in-
creases as a result of the leak.
170. Such agreements are common to litigation services providers. These
companies hire nonlawyers to assist in cost-effective preparation of litigation
paperwork for large law firms. Employees are required to sign confidentiality
agreements because they are exposed to confidential client documents and at-
torney work product.
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the relationship between the board of directors of legal services
societies and the societies' staff attorneys discusses client con-
fidences and places limitations on attorneys' rights to disclose
these confidences to their superiors. 71 These limitations may
be equally applied to MDPs as well as legal aid societies.
In a related vein, Model Rule 1.6 currently allows lawyers
to make disclosures that are "impliedly authorized in order to
carry out the representation."172 Thus, disclosure to a nonlaw-
yer would not violate the ethical rule if necessary to carry out
the representation. Furthermore, if a lawyer decides it is nec-
essary to disclose confidential information to a nonlawyer for
some reason, the lawyer can also ask for the client's consent to
disclose the information.17 3 In view of the foregoing, there is no
reason to believe that client confidences would be less protected
within an MDP than any other law firm.
3. Damage to the Long-Term Reputation and Viability of the
Profession
Those concerned about MDPs often mention a general con-
cern for the profession of lawyering. If lawyers are treated
more and more like any other professional interested in profits,
say those so concerned, the profession is bound to lose its sense
of "special purpose" in civil society. That is, allowing MDPs
will denigrate the legal profession to a mere business. 7 4 These
critics claim that allowing a law firm to be owned by nonlaw-
yers will turn the focus of a law firm towards cost-cutting in an
attempt to maximize shareholder value at the expense of client
service.
171. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 324 (1970). The
pertinent provision states that "[tihe board may require staff attorneys to dis-
close to the board such information about their clients and cases as is rea-
sonably necessary to determine whether the board's policies are being carried
out." Id. This broad provision was later limited by a 1974 Formal Opinion
that required client anonymity be preserved in communications with the soci-
ety's board, and also require that a staff attorney receive the knowledgeable
consent of the client before divulging client confidences or secrets to others.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334
(1974). Although the ABA noted that nonprofit organizations are not subject
to the requirements of Rule 5.4(d), it emphasized that such organizations must
comply with Rule 1.6 on client confidences. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES,
supra note 157, at 460.
172. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983).
173. See id.
174. See Carson, supra note 145, at 605-08.
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These critics fail to see that a trend is well under way in
which the practice of law is becoming more the business of law.
Altering the Model Rules to allow law firms access to the public
equity markets would be beneficial to the legal profession as a
whole. Over the last ten years, the legal "profession" has un-
dergone changes that arguably warrant renaming it the legal
services "business."175 Today, more so than at any time in the
past, lawyers run their firms like traditional businesses. 7 6 The
tremendous competition among law firms has forced law firm
owners, their partners and their shareholders, to become more
concerned with profits and efficiency. Those managing private,
for-profit law firms have realized the stark reality that their
law firms must be viewed as businesses in order to survive in
this competitive marketplace. Indeed, one commentator
bluntly stated "organizations [such as law firms] that were once
synonymous with equability, professionalism and familial spirit
have been molded by harsh economic forces into large, disputa-
tious businesses."' 7
A rapidly changing legal economy has provided the impe-
tus for this new focus on the business of managing law firms.
The Altman Weil Pensa Survey of Law Firm Economics showed
that per-lawyer overhead increased more than 81% over the
last ten years, while per-lawyer revenues increased only
175. See id. at 605. According to Carson:
The definition of the term "profession" is by no means universally
agreed upon. Traditionally, a business might be defined as an entity
that promotes the greatest societal good by maximizing its profit,
whereas a profession might be defined as an entity that seeks to pro-
mote the greatest societal good by maximizing its service....
The reality today, of course, is that very few people would choose
a profession without regard to its potential profitability. The diffi-
culty arises when professional decisions are driven solely by profit-
ability.
Id. at 605-06 (footnotes omitted).
176. See Ward Bower, Surviving the 1990s, LAW PEAC. MGMT., July-Aug.
1990, at 26, 26-27. Bower suggests that:
Established law firms will shift from "fraternal" organizations, char-
acterized by collegiality, seniority advancement and compensation
and consensus decision-making, to a "business" approach, character-
ized by interpartner accountability, merit-based compensation and
centralized management. Economic realities of law practice, com-
bined with competitive and market pressures, will lead more lawyers
to leave the profession and to seek employment in other areas.
Id.
177. S.S. Samuelson, The Organizational Structure of Law Firms: Lessons
from Management Theory, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 645 (1990).
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73%.178 As of 1996, the United States had approximately
900,000 lawyers today, up almost 40% from ten years before.179
Moreover, in 1996 the United States had 336 law firms with
over 100 lawyers and over 700 more with over 60 lawyers.
80
Three law firms had over 1,000 lawyers, yet in 1980 those same
three firms had fewer than 300 lawyers.18 '
Unlike other businesses, during this transformation law
firms have been deprived of a favored source of capital-
namely, the equity capital available from the private, passive
investor. As discussed earlier, the Model Rules prohibit
nonlawyers from owning any interest in a law firm. This
position, however, is fraught with irony. While proponents of
this traditional prohibition against nonlawyer investment
claim the rule is necessary to protect the integrity of the
profession, real economic pressures threaten to undermine the
integrity of the profession in law offices across the country on a
daily basis. These pressures could be eased if law firms had
access to the public equity markets.
Additionally, law firms have been barred from meeting di-
verse client needs by providing ancillary services in the same
firm as legal services. This has limited the growth of firms and
has been a disservice to clients who must seek separate profes-
sionals to meet their varied needs.
In response to those concerned about this denigration of
the legal profession to a mere business, the Commission crafted
proposals to protect the critical nature of the profession. The
first element of its Recommendation stressed that "[t]he legal
profession should adopt and maintain rules of professional con-
duct that protect its core values, independence of professional
judgment, protection of confidential client information, and
loyalty to the client through avoidance of conflicts of inter-
est."182
The Commission, in addressing the issue of MDPs' general
harm to the profession, noted that it sought evidence of harm to
clients in "analogous situations," and found no such evidence.18 3
Actions alleging malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty against
178. See Ward Bower, Economic Trends in the Legal Profession, 32 ARIZ.
ATT'Y, May 1996, at 16, 17.
179. See id. at 17.
180. See id. at 18.
181. See id.
182. REcOMMENDATION, supra note 87, Recommendation 1.
183. See REPORTER's NOTES, supra note 18.
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a law firm and an ancillary business, for example, could not be
found. 8 4 The Commission also heard and addressed concerns
that MDPs would tend to concentrate legal resources into giant
firms, destroying small and solo providers, and thereby hurting
the independence of the profession. The Commission reported
that informal surveys established that most small firms and
solo practitioners were interested in creating MDPs of their
own.
18 5
To protect the profession's values in an MDP controlled by
nonlawyers, the Commission proposed that the MDP sign a
written statement and deliver it to the highest regulatory body
in the MDP's jurisdiction. That statement would hold that the
MDP will, generally, not interfere with a lawyer's professional
judgment. 18 6 As far as MDPs controlled by lawyers, the Com-
mission requires no such statement in that case, since "the
likelihood of such interference is significantly diminished."187
4. Unauthorized Practice of Law
Another fear held by those who oppose ending the prohibi-
tion on MDPs is that it will lead to the unauthorized practice of
law. Critics suggest that although such trespasses onto the
protected turf of lawyers may not be purposeful, they will occur
accidentally.18 8 Critics argue that this may occur because the
limits of "the practice of law" are undefined, and differ by juris-
diction.18 9 But it is these very differences in the definition of
"the practice of law" which show that this fear is unfounded.
Many states, for example, place the power to draft real es-
tate documents solely in the hands of lawyers; however, in
1962, Arizona chose to grant real estate brokers and salesper-
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See RECOMMENDATION, supra note 87, Recommendation 14.
187. REPORTERS NOTES, supra note 18 (emphasis added).
188. It is suggested, for example, that a real estate agent partnered with a
tax or real estate lawyer may discuss the tax results of a proposed real estate
transaction. If this took place in a real estate office, the client may question
the validity of the advice, but if the same comment is given in a law office, it
may cairy more weight with the client. See Carson, supra note 145, at 615-17;
see also In re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 654 A.2d 1344, 1345-46 (N.J. 1995) (per curiam) (finding residential real
estate brokers and title company officers may conduct real estate transactions
that involve many aspects of the practice of law, provided they warn custom-
ers of their conflicting interests and of the risk of not being represented by an
attorney).
189. See Carson, supra note 145, at 615-16.
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sons the concurrent authority to draft such documents. 190
Since then, these nonlawyers have been serving client needs,
and, after almost thirty-five years, no hard evidence has shown
that clients have received poor advice or service as a result of
Arizona's choice. 191
Additionally, the practice of law in partnerships has grown
to include all manner of nonlawyers who successfully face the
daily challenge of not practicing law. Law firms employ para-
legals, legal secretaries, and other nonlawyer personnel who
constantly deal with clients. These nonlawyers may not give
legal advice to clients, and they may not take other actions that
may be construed as the practice of law. If they violate this
rule, the lawyer or law firm employer may be sanctioned.192 If
these employees and assistants of lawyers can coexist with the
ethics rules, why can't nonlawyer investors and partners? The
answer is, they can.
A lawyer who enters business with nonlawyers remains
bound by the applicable rules of conduct. Supervising lawyers
are required to ensure that the conduct of nonlawyers is "com-
patible with the professional obligations of the lawyer."193
Compliance with these rules requires that lawyers not assist in
the unauthorized practice of law,194 not share client confidences
with unauthorized persons, 195 and not allow the nonlawyer to
affect the lawyer's independent professional judgment. 196
One additional criticism surrounding attempts to allow
lawyers to become partners with nonlawyers is that it presents
those with limited legal training the opportunity to practice law
without a license. 197 The fear is that this may be a back-door
into legal practice for law school graduates who cannot pass the
bar or for disbarred lawyers. The reality is that the rules re-
190. See Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do
Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors--or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 159, 210-11.
191. See id.
192. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.3(c) (1983).
193. Id. Rule 5.3(b). A lawyer is responsible for the conduct of a nonlawyer
employee if the lawyer orders or ratifies the specific conduct involved, or if the
lawyer is a partner in the firm in which the nonlawyer is employed and knows
in advance of inappropriate conduct, but fails to take remedial action. See id.
Rule 5.3(c).
194. See id. Rule 5.5(b).
195. See id. Rule 1.6.
196. See id. Rule 5.4(c).
197. See Carson, supra note 145, at 617.
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quiring lawyers to be responsible for such nonlawyers' actions
apply in this case, just as they do for paralegals or any other
nonlawyer. It is also unlikely that abuses of this nature will be
common-few practicing attorneys are likely to avail them-
selves of the services of those found not worthy of admission to
the bar or those whose ethics resulted in the removal of their
license to practice.
The existing rules and standards of ethical conduct already
provide for nearly all contingencies that a lawyer may face re-
garding the unauthorized practice of law. Allowing nonlawyers
to work beside lawyers would not change this situation. Law-
yers would continue to practice law, and nonlawyers would con-
tinue to not practice law. The benefits of a business association
between a lawyer and a nonlawyer do not, and would not, arise
through the unethical utilization of unauthorized legal work,
but rather, through the provision of ancillary services and
through unlimited capitalization through the financial mar-
kets.
CONCLUSION
Multidisciplinary practice-no matter what one thinks of
the issue-is certain to have an enormous impact on the provi-
sion of legal services. To cast the issue in extremes, if nothing
is done to meet the competition from nonlegal professionals,
lawyers and law firms will suffer great financial hardship; on
the other hand, if rules of ethics are disregarded, the law firm
as we know it will disappear into the swirling mass of the pro-
fessional services market. The ABA Commission on Multidis-
ciplinary Practice has done an admirable job in quickly pre-
senting the issues and making recommendations.
Implementing those recommendations is a process that will
take several years, but it is a process that is inevitable and,
more importantly, justifiable.
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Permitting Lawyers To Participate in
Multidisciplinary Practices: Business as Usual
or the End of the Profession as We Know It?
Carol A. Needhamt
Consideration of changes in the permissible vehicles for
delivery of legal services has been simmering for decades. The
convening of the American Bar Association's Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice (MDP)1 in August 1998, however,
marked the first time in twenty years that the legal profession
has conducted a national discussion acknowledging the changes
in the entities which have been delivering legal services.2 In
1980, the Kutak Commission 3 proposed a Model Rule that
would have permitted fee sharing in certain situations.4 The
arguments for and against that proposed rule have been ably
t Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law (e-
mail: needhamc@slu.edu). BA., Northwestern University 1979, M.A., Univer-
sity of Virginia 1982, J.D., Northwestern University School of Law 1985. I
would like to thank Kathleen Clark, Larry Fox, and Dennis Tuchler for their
thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I am also grateful to the
other participants in this Symposium, especially Charles Wolfram, whose con-
versations furthered my thinking on these topics. Finally, I am grateful to
Irene Marusic for her superb research assistance. Copyright © 2000 by Carol
A. Needham.
1. Hereinafter, referred to as the Commission.
2. See COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, REPORT (1999), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/mdpreport.html>
[hereinafter REPORT].
3. The formal title of the Kutak Commission was the ABA Commission
on Evaluation of Professional Standards, chaired by Robert J. Kutak. See
COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROF'L STANDARDS, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON STUDY OF THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980).
4. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROF'L STANDARDS, AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT 175-78 (1981). The requirements of the proposed rule imposed by
the Commission included the following: the nonlawyer could not interfere with
either the attorney's professional judgment or the relation between the attor-
ney and the client, protection for client confidences, compliance with rules re-
stricting advertising and solicitation, and prohibiting improper fees. See id. at
175.
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detailed elsewhere.5 What this Article addresses are the con-
sistent themes that are again under discussion in the debate
over multidisciplinary practice.6
Academics and other commentators have debated whether
the practice of law is a profession 7 or a business. Judicial
opinions 8 and academic articles have frequently declared law
practice to be a noble profession.9 Other opinions and distin-
guished observers just as insistently declare that the law is a
business and should be treated as such.' 0 Perhaps it is closest
5. See generally CENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR
Ass'N, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 159-64
(1987); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 7.5 (Discussion Draft
1980); Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One
Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules? 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 594 (1989);
Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals
Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383, 384-86 (1988); Laurel S.
Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a New Rule?, 72
TEMP. L. REV. 869 (2000).
6. See generally Gianluca Morello, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop
Worldwide for Law Firms: Why Multi-Discipline Practices Should Be Permit-
ted in the United States, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 190 (1997); Ronald A. Landen,
Comment, The Prospects of the Accountant-Lawyer Multidisciplinary Partner-
ship in English-speaking Countries, 13 EMORY INTL L. REV. 763 (1999).
7. The definition of a "profession" articulated by Judge Posner is apt:
The hallmark of a profession is the belief that it is an occupation of
considerable public importance, the practice of which requires highly
specialized, even esoteric, knowledge that can be acquired only by
specialized formal education or a carefully supervised apprenticeship,
hence an occupation that cannot responsibly be entered at will but
only in compliance with a specified, and usually, exacting protocol
and upon proof of competence.
Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
8. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Murrell, 74 So. 2d 221, 226 (Fla.
1954) (en banc) ("The law is not a business,-it is a profession, a noble one,
with standards in certain respects different from those applicable to business,
which standards it is the duty of the bar to uphold."). This opinion has been
cited in the report by the "Con" Subcommittee of the Florida Bar Special
Committee on Multidisciplinary Practice. See MICHAEL NACHWALTER ET AL.,
FACING THE TIDE OF CHANGE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF MDP'S ON THE
PUBLIC IN FLORIDA 11 (1999) [hereinafter FLORIDA CON-MDP REPORT], avail-
able at <http'//www.flabar.org/newflabar/organization/committees/conmdp.
pdf>.
9. See Neil W. Hamilton, Are We a Profession or Merely a Business? The
Erosion of Rule 5.6 and the Bar Against Restrictions on the Right to Practice,
22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1409, 1431 (1996) (arguing that lawyers should
continue to be prevented from entering into noncompetition agreements,
"[since the monetization of professional values continues to erode the ethics of
the profession").
10. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368 n.19 (1977) (agreeing with
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to the mark to acknowledge that law practice is simultaneously
a profession and a business. While pure profit-maximization
alone is not a sufficient guiding principle in a law practice, it is
also true that there is no inherent disgrace in seeking to oper-
ate at a profit. Both the traditionally espoused high ideals and
profit-oriented, bottom-line concerns are inseparable parts of
the reality in the practice of law today.
I. MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE
The major elements of the proposal contained in the Com-
mission's Final Report" have been ably described elsewhere. 12
Three critical issues are the primary focus of this Article: first,
the permitted scope of practice for multidisciplinary partner-
ships; second, an analysis of "holding out" and the unauthor-
ized practice of law as applied to professionals working in mul-
tidisciplinary settings; and finally, the degree to which conflicts
of interest must be imputed in a multidisciplinary partnership.
In addition, whether MDPs are permitted or not, lawyers must
reform the regulations that currently hamper conducting mul-
tijurisdictional practices in law firms and corporate legal de-
partments. The restrictions on lawyers practicing in tradi-
tional settings should not be more onerous than those
envisioned for lawyers practicing in MDPs.
counsel's argument that '[w]e all know that law offices are big businesses,
that they may have billion-dollar or million-dollar clients, they're run with
computers, and all the rest. And so the argument may be made that to term
them noncommercial is sanctimonious humbug.'"); Edward S. Adams & John
H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board? A Proposal for Nonlawyer In-
vestment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1998) (arguing that the risk
of commercializing law practice is not a reason for banning nonlawyer owner-
ship because law practice is already a business); see also PRO-MDP SUBCOMM.
FLA. BAR SPECIAL COiMM. ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, FACING THE
INEVITABILITY, RAPIDITY AND DYNAMICS OF CHANGE, REPORT TO THE BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FLORIDA BAR 12 (2000), available at
<http'/www.flabar.org/newflabar/organization/comm.Hees/promdp.pdf>. See
generally, Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND.
L.J. 1 (1993).
11. See REPORT, supra note 2.
12. See generally Terry, supra note 5.
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A. SCOPE OF PRACTICE
1. An MDP Firm Should Not Provide Audit Services and
Legal Services to the Same Client
There is an inherent conflict of interest between the
auditing function 13 on one hand, and consulting, the practice of
law, and business valuation 14 on the other. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), through its General Counsel and
its Office of the Chief Accountant, has already declared that it
considers an auditor's independence to be impaired if the audi-
tor's firm also provides legal advice to a client.15 In addition,
the accounting industry's Independent Standards Board (ISB)16
is currently studying the issue of whether auditor independ-
ence is compromised when other arms of the same firm provide
consulting services. 17 Consideration of auditor independence
when other members of the same accounting firm provide busi-
13. Auditing has been defined as performing "an independent examina-
tion to determine the propriety of accounting processes, measurements, and
communication." Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, Report, Conclu-
sions and Recommendations xiii (1978), quoted in 2 LoUis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, SEcURITIEs REGULATION 752 (3d ed. 1999).
14. The term "business valuation" refers to services provided to a buyer or
seller of a business in which a financial analyst assesses the market value of
the business.
15. See Letter from Harvey J. Goldschmid, General Counsel, Securities
and Exchange Commission, to Philip S. Anderson, President, American Bar
Association (July 12, 1999), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/
cpr/goldschmid.html> (stating "the SEC has long made clear that its inde-
pendence rules prohibit an auditor from certifying the financial statements of
a client with which his firm also has an attorney-client relationship"); Letter
from Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, to Sherwin P. Simmons, Chair of the Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice, American Bar Association (Jan. 22, 1999) (stating that if a firm pro-
vides legal advice to a securities registrant, the firm's independence as an
auditor is impaired (citing Samuel George Greenspan, Securities Act of 1933
Release No. 6097, 49 S.E.C. Docket 1086, 1099 (Aug. 26, 1991); Samuel George
Greenspan, Litig. Release No. 12862, 48 S.E.C. Docket 1690, 1691 (May 23,
1991))) [hereinaier Turner Letter].
16. The Securities and Exchange Commission established the eight-
member Independence Standards Board in 1997 "for promulgating independ-
ence standards and interpretations for auditors of public entities." Division of
Corporate Financing, Securities and Exch. Comm'n, Current Accounting and
Disclosure Issues (Jan. 21, 2000), available at <http'//www.sec.gov/offices/
corpfin/acctdisc.html> [hereinafter Current Accounting and Disclosure Issues].
17. The SEC officially supported the ISB's consideration of the issue. "In
a letter dated January 7, 1999, I asked the ISB to consider placing the topic of
legal advisory services on its agenda and suggested that the ISB consult with
your Commission." Turner Letter, supra note 15, at 3.
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ness valuation services has also been proposed.' 8 The likely
conclusion of these studies will be that to preserve the auditor's
independence, the auditing function should not be performed
by professionals whose firm also provides consulting or valua-
tion services to the audit client. There is some advantage in
having the ISB announce that decision rather than the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA). However, in light of the impor-
tance of the values at issue, the legal community should also
make its views known.
The most logically coherent position will require a com-
plete financial separation between entities that provide audit-
ing services and entities that provide business valuation, con-
sulting, and legal services. No profits should be exchanged
between the two. No expense-sharing or discounting of com-
puter services, office space, or other overhead should be permit-
ted. There is even a question as to whether the non-auditing
firms spun off from the Big Five accounting firms 19 should be
allowed to do business under trade names using elements of
Arthur Andersen, Ernst & Young, PricewaterhouseCoopers,
and the like. Those firms developed their credibility and strong
name-recognition in the business community as a result of the
auditing work they have historically performed. Permitting the
consulting service entities to incorporate elements of those
trade names20 is therefore a troubling brand extension.
Publicly-listed companies must have their audits per-
formed by one of the Big Five. The usual assumptions about
the balance of power between the client and the professional
are thus turned upside down-the client needs to keep the
auditor happy even more than the auditor needs to retain the
particular client. In this situation, the auditor who suggests
using an affiliated consulting entity (or multidisciplinary firm)
is exercising unseemly power over the client. Moreover, the
18. The Independence Standards Board, working with the Independence
Issues Committee, has issued discussion memoranda concerning the structure
of accounting practices and appraisal and valuation services. See Current Ac-
counting and Disclosure Issues, supra note 16.
19. The term "the Big Five" refers to the major accounting and profes-
sional service firms, which are currently known as Arthur Andersen, Deloitte
& Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP.
20. See An Of Counsel Roundtable: Branding Strategies Turn Inward in
Keen Pursuit of Institutional Differentiation, OF COUNSEL, Dec. 6, 1999 at 28,
28 (discussing the emotional value of a brand name as a basis for charging
higher prices).
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auditor has access to all of the audited client's financial infor-
mation. This access gives the auditor significant confidential
information about the audited company's operations. Conse-
quently, the auditor should not be permitted to leverage that
information and to profit from the access that the securities
regulations require be given to the auditor. In a profit-seeking
professional services firm, it is unlikely that the other profes-
sionals at the firm would be able to resist attempting to ascer-
tain what consulting services the auditors have determined
that the audit client might need. Indeed, selling other services
to audit clients is a cornerstone of the market development
plans of the Big Five.
Finally, and most importantly, an auditor has an obliga-
tion to inform the SEC's Office of the Chief Accountant if the
Auditor becomes aware of a material illegal act and the com-
pany's audit committee or management fails to respond appro-
priately to the auditor's report.21 Auditors cannot deliver a
clean report if the audit uncovers fraud or other illegal acts by
personnel working at a registered company.22 Consultants, and
those performing business valuations, have no similar obliga-
tion. Attorneys, however, have an affirmative duty to keep
their clients' confidences and secrets. Some academics23 are
urging that attorneys be permitted, or even required, to break
confidentiality in circumstances broader than those described
in the current rules;24 nevertheless, the rules now in effect al-
low less disclosure by attorneys. At present, attorneys in most
states have the option of coming forward only in certain limited
21. See Securities Exchange Act § 10A(b)(3); 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 13, at 765.
22. The duty of the public accountant is "to safeguard the public interest,
not that of [a] client." Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 768 (quoting
Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 SEC 629, 670-71 (1957)).
23. See generally Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Dis-
closure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 221 (1995) (proposing that clients be able to obtain legal services from
lawyers who have declared, ex ante, whether or not they will disclose client
fraud).
24. The current language in DR 4-101 in the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and Model Rule 1.6 in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
provides a starting point for analysis. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 (1983). However, the majority of the jurisdictions in the United
States have adopted alternative language describing the circumstances in
which information can be revealed. See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS, STATUTES AND STANDARDS 75-79 (1999).
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circumstances. Although Florida,25 Ilhinois, 26 Massachusetts, 27
New Jersey,28 and Virginia 9 require attorneys licensed in those
states to disclose information in certain situations, other juris-
dictions, which base their provisions more closely on the lan-
guage of Model Code DR 4-101 and Model Rule 1.6, do not per-
mit attorneys to reveal confidential information without
obtaining client consent.30 Accordingly, the attorney's duty of
confidentiality is inconsistent with the auditor's duty to the in-
vesting public.31 SEC Commissioner Norman Johnson has also
expressed this view by publicly stating that representing a cli-
ent as an attorney is inconsistent with the independence neces-
sary for the auditor's role.32
25. Florida's Rule 1.6 requires an attorney to reveal information the at-
torney "reasonably believes necessary (1) to prevent a client from committing
a crime; or (2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another." FLA.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1994).
26. Illinois's Rule 1.6 requires the lawyer to reveal information "to the ex-
tent it appears necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that
would result in death or serious bodily harm." ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1994).
27. Massachusetts' Rule 1.6 goes farther and requires lawyers to reveal
information (to the extent required by Rules 3.3 and 4.1(b)) "to prevent the
commission of a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes
is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury
to the financial interests or property of another, or to prevent the wrongful
execution or incarceration of another." MASS. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998).
28. New Jersey also requires a lawyer to reveal confidential information
"to prevent the client from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act...
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of another," or to prevent a client from commit-
ting "a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes
is likely to perpetuate a fraud upon a tribunal." N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1984).
29. Virginia's DR 4-101(D)(1) provides that a lawyer must reveal his cli-
ent's intention "as stated by the client, to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime." VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 4-101(D)(1) (1983).
30. Except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized to carry out the
representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmts.
7, 8 (1983).
31. See A Glimpse of Our Future: Lawyers, Accountants and Management
Consultants?, J. MGMT. CONSULTING, Nov. 1998, at 69, available at 1998 WL
12790594 (discussing the differing obligations to clients borne by attorneys
and accountants).
32. Commissioner Johnson expanded on this point in the following section
of his speech, discussing a letter SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner sent to
the ISB, expressing the SEC staffs:
deep concern about press reports describing possible expansion by ac-
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The MDP Commission has stated that it will recommend
that a client should not be permitted to purchase both auditing
services and legal services from the same MDP.33 Because this
recommendation does not require that auditors be employed by
entities which are entirely separate from the legal service pro-
viders, it does not go far enough to eliminate the problems out-
lined earlier. Moreover, even if the auditing business is split
off from other services offered by the MDP, indications are that
the Big Five and other professional services firms would be
quite content to lose the ability to offer auditing services be-
cause they see the growth of profitable business in the con-
sulting services, rather than in auditing.34 SEC Commissioner
Norman Johnson called attention to these developments when
he stated:
Accounting firms have found that the audit business that has been
their bread and butter from the start of the profession does not allow
for sufficient financial growth. So accounting firms have looked for
new sources of income and have ventured into services well beyond
their traditional businesses, which may conflict with their estab-
lished roles as auditors. As a result of these changes, we have ob-
served that the financial importance of the audit function to ac-
counting firms, particularly the larger ones, is declining, the
provision of non-audit services is increasing, and the business rela-
counting firms into legal services, including representing clients be-
fore the IRS, providing advice on structuring corporate transactions
and benefit plans, and providing expert witness testimony for cli-
ents .... In my view-and I know of no disagreement at the Commis-
sion on this issue-an accountant-attorney relationship with a client
is totally inconsistent at least with the appearance of independence.
Attorneys have an ethical duty to zealously represent the interests of
their private clients, and it is impossible to reconcile this role as ad-
vocate with the duty accountants and auditors owe to the investing
public.
Norman Johnson, SEC Commissioner, Current Regulatory and Enforcement
Developments Affecting the Accounting Profession, Address at the 26th An-
nual Securities Regulation Institute Conference, at *3 (Jan. 20, 1999), avail-
able at 1999 WL 77217 [hereinafter Johnson Address].
33. COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
POSTSCRIPT TO FEBRUARY 2000 MIDYEAR MEETING, available at
<http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/postscript.html> [hereinafter POSTSCRIPT].
34. See, e.g., Mike Allen, Accountants Become Consultants in Greater
Numbers, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Jan. 17, 2000 at 15, available at 2000 WL
10502100; Hilary Joffe, A Strategy to Take on the Big Five, BUSINESS DAY
(South Africa), Feb. 10, 2000, at 16, available at 2000 WL 7450497 (reporting
on an interview with Jim Copeland, global C.E. of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu,
where he stated that "[tjhe trend away from auditing to consulting continues,
as it does for all the Big Five. Auditing makes up about 40% of global reve-
nue.... This is a marked shift from 15 years ago, when in the U.S. 75% to
80% of revenue came from auditing.")
1322 [Vol. 84:1315
BUSINESS AS USUAL?
tionships between auditors and their audit clients are increasing and
expanding.35
In addition, the other problems posed by nonlawyers offering
legal services designated as "consulting," or some term other
than legal services, and by different standards for imputation
of conflicts of interest still remain, even if personnel employed
by the entity offering those services do not conduct audits.
2. Attorney-Client Contact
Attorneys who work at accounting firms and other profes-
sional services firms should not permit themselves to be
stripped of their ability to exercise independent legal judgment
in their role as counsel. In general, attorneys evaluate whether
a particular course of action will allow the client to attain his or
her larger goal. Lawyers do not simply execute transactions or
determine whether or not documents constitute binding con-
tracts. A lawyer's counseling function is extremely valuable.
Lawyers should not permit their work product to be mass-
produced and sent out to clients for whom the mass-produced
"solution" may not be adequate. Some degree of discussion
with the individual clients and tailoring of the work product for
that client is the norm in legal practice.
Commodification of legal advice is objectionable when the
provider presents a cookie-cutter package as though it had
been specifically tailored for that particular client. As long as
the legal information presented in TurboTax and other mass-
marketed data-sorting products is accurate, there is a legiti-
mate claim that distribution of the products meets a consumer
need. Users of such data-sorting products can be expected to
realize that the products can provide some guidance regarding
basic categories of information, but that the products do not ex-
ercise professional judgment regarding the particular situation
facing the user. A different situation is presented, however,
when a legal service provider delivers her work product after
having some direct interaction with the client. In this case, the
client is likely to expect that the lawyer has specifically evalu-
ated her situation, and that the work product represents efforts
tailored to her specific situation.
Although a small number of client matters can readily be
handled with a standard-issue set of forms, professional judg-
ment must be used to determine whether those forms will ac-
35. Johnson Address, supra note 32, at *2.
20001 1323
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tually accomplish the clients' goals. Likewise, professional
judgment must be used to appropriately modify the standard
forms to reflect changes in the law and variations in the clients'
situations. The great majority of TurboTax users most likely
have the same goals: accurately determining the tax they owe
and taking advantage of all deductions legitimately available to
them. In contrast, persons looking for advice when selling
their family business or contemplating other transactions have
a variety of different objectives. Careful client interviewing by
attorneys is needed to tease out which legal categories apply to
the client's situation and will best help the client accomplish
his goals.
Often, thoughtful questioning by an expert is necessary to
elicit information about the client's goals. Frequently, after
hearing more about the alternatives available to them, clients
will discover that their objectives are more likely to be attained
by using a different structure for the transaction or pursuing a
different course of action than they had originally envisioned.
This counseling role is crucial to the attorney-client relation-
ship. It cannot be duplicated when a person lacking legal
training simply hands the client standard papers to fulfill the
goal the client initially declared he wanted to accomplish.
If no attorney attempts to ascertain the client's objectives,
opportunities to maximize the attainment of the client's goals are
lost. This is similar to the difference between having a cobbler
create individual shoes to order rather than choosing from shoes
available only in size 6, 9 and 12. For some people, the shoes in
the limited range will work perfectly well, while others may dam-
age their feet trying to jam them into shoes that do not fit their
situation closely enough. Over time, mass-produced clothing and
shoes have become far more differentiated. Instead of small, me-
dium and large shoes, they are now available in a variety of sizes,
which change in such small increments that most people can
readily find a size that has a satisfactory fit. Because it is not a
tangible good, providers of legal advice will never be able to ade-
quately serve their clients by simply displaying an array of mass-
produced products, each slightly different from the next and ask-
ing the consumer to choose the one that fits his situation most
closely. The consumer will need to engage in a dialogue with the
provider and the provider will have to exercise judgment to tailor
a legal product that suits the client's situation.
For these reasons, interposing an additional person be-
tween the client and the lawyer is troubling. The situations of
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in-house counsel and lawyers providing advice to members of
labor unions are not exactly analogous to that of a lawyer
working in an MDP. Attorneys working in-house and for union
members are free to directly communicate with their clients.
In contrast, lawyers working for personal services firms that
are not controlled by other attorneys may often communicate
with their clients through other members of the firm who
might (perhaps unintentionally) thwart the lawyer's profes-
sional judgment. For example, the other member of the firm
might water down the lawyer's advice or change the lawyer's
analysis as she conveys it to the client. Likewise, the client
should be able to directly ask the lawyer for clarification to be
certain that he understands all of his options. Direct contact
between the attorney and the client who is ultimately receiving
the legal advice is an important aspect of the attorney-client
relationship and this aspect should be preserved in the MDP
setting.
B. ATTEMPTING To RESTRAIN NONLAWYER PRACTICE BY
MONITORING "HOLDING OUT"
1. Big Five Firms Are Doing Legal Work
The Big Five accounting firms currently employ profes-
sionals who are doing work that traditionally has been thought
to constitute law practice. The marketing brochures may call it
"practicing ERISA" or "estate planning consulting," but the
work itself is indistinguishable from that performed by law-
yers.3 6 Indeed, some of the accounting firms' websites explicitly
state that they offer legal services.37 Partners who have
36. In its PostScript to the February 2000 Midyear Meeting, the Commis-
sion noted that many persons "disingenuously claim to be 'practicing consult-
ing,'. . . even though the services they are rendering to the firms' clients have
been reported to the Commission as being comparable to the services being
rendered on a daily basis by lawyers in law firms to the law firms' clients."
POSTSCRIPT, supra note 33.
37. For example, KPMG Tax and Legal states on its website that the firm
offers:
[A] full range of tax and legal services including corporate and indi-
vidual planning and compliance, as well as global projects which in-
volve designing and implementing tax strategies to produce sustain-
able long-term tax savings. We also offer advice in international
specialist areas such as international corporate tax, mergers and ac-
quisitions, transfer pricing, indirect tax and customs and Interna-
tional Executive Services.
KPMG Services, (visited Apr. 19, 2000) <http://www.kpmg.com>; see also De-
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worked for years in traditional law firms have been recruited to
work for the Big Five firms. 38 The accounting firms tell the
lawyers that if they join their firm, the lawyers will be able to
do the same work that they have been doing as a member of a
law firm.39 A number of attorneys who have joined these firms
have stated that they are performing precisely the same legal
analysis in their current settings as they did while they worked
at law firms. 40 In addition, nonlawyer partners and employees
at these firms are staffing mergers, acquisitions, and other
transactions, which in the past were handled by attorneys.
Granted, this is merely anecdotal evidence; however, in light of
the confidential nature of the client relationship and the poten-
tial ramifications of admitting improper fee splitting and unau-
thorized practice of law, it is not surprising that empirical evi-
dence on this point is scant.
There are several ways to look at the key question: Are the
"consultants" working for Big Five firms actually practicing
law? Or, is it possible that for years, lawyers have been per-
forming work that is not fundamentally legal work? That is,
have lawyers been claiming that only an attorney perform work
that could just as competently be performed by a person with
loitte & Touche Enterprise Risk Services (visited Apr. 18, 2000)
<http'//www.dttus.com/risk/customers/services/lrc/index.htm> (providing in-
formation about Deloitte & Touche's "Legal and Regulatory Compliance"
services); Anderson Legal (visited Apr. 18, 2000) <http'//www.andersenlegal.
com/WebsiteLegal.nsf/Content/MarketOfferingsLegalServicesApproach?Open
Document> (offering help in sorting through local laws by carefully stating
that its legal services are provided by Andersen Legal, an international net-
work of law firms associated with Andersen Worldwide, rather than implying
that the services are performed by members of Andersen itself).
38. Partners from Debevoise & Plimpton, McDermott Will & Emery and
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich have moved to provide tax services at Ernst &
Young. See Rosie Murray-West, Clients Choose Graft over Glitter, INT'L TAX
REV., Sept. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 13757582. Since 1996, Ernst &
Young has hired about 50 tax attorneys. See id. Four tax partners from
Baker & McKenzie moved to PricewaterhouseCoopers, and two left the firm to
join Deloitte & Touche. See id.
39. See FLORIDA CON-MDP REPORT, supra note 8, at 38. "One lawyer was
offered a position with an accounting firm, and was assured that the lawyer's
day-to-day practice would be virtually the same as it is with the lawyer's pri-
vate law firm." See id.
40. Partners with 30 years experience in law firms have joined several of
the Big Five. See Larry Smith & Lori Tripoli, Sleeping with the Enemy: Law
Firms Forge Strategic Alliances with Big 5 Bugaboos and Get Mixed Results,
OF COUNSEL, Nov. 1, 1999, at 1, 8. A certain number of lawyers have moved
back to law firms after a stint with one of the Big Five, saying that they did
not like the emphasis on selling products. See id.
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no legal training? As a profession, we must confront this issue.
The status quo is not sustainable. If valuable knowledge is
gained only through legal training and licensure, then only
those who hold a law license should be allowed to give legal ad-
vice. Furthermore, only those who hold a law license, or those
working under the direct supervision of a lawyer, should be al-
lowed to provide legal services. People who have never earned
a law license should not be permitted to perform legal work by
renaming it consulting or some other term. However, if there
is no reason to require that only lawyers may give certain kinds
of advice related to the law, we must acknowledge that as well.
2. Drawing a Clear Boundary
The heart of the matter is the struggle to determine
whether or not we can draw a clear boundary around work that
can be performed only by persons who have passed the current
competence and character evaluations to become licensed at-
torneys. Commentators and witnesses testifying before the
Commission have stated that, aside from courtroom work and
delivery of legal opinions, it is impossible to articulate a defen-
sible definition of the practice of law.41 Furthermore, they say
that various Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) Committees
and other prosecutors of UPL violations have never faced an
opponent as well-financed and sophisticated as the Big Five ac-
counting firms. The tenacity of the litigation opponent, how-
ever, is immaterial to the validity of the policy arguments. If
the standards fail to hold up under scrutiny, UPL enforcement
prosecutors should not apply those faulty standards. Publish-
ers of self-help books and storefront notarias should be prose-
cuted only if, as a profession, UPL enforcers are also willing to
prosecute well-financed entities involved in UPL. The legal
profession must confront the issue squarely: Must certain ac-
tivities be reserved only for attorneys? This question must be
addressed. We cannot dodge the issue by only banning "hold-
ing out" while not banning the practice of law by nonlawyers.
3. Banning "Holding Out"
Prohibiting 'holding out" 42 is not a way to prohibit the
practice of law by nonlawyers while circumventing the difficult
41. See infra text accompanying notes 100-01, 152.
42. A nonlawyer improperly holds herself out as an attorney when she
makes statements or adopts symbols that would mislead a member of the gen-
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task of defining the practice of law. As "holding out" has been
defined by the Commission, an entity holds out a person as an
attorney when the entity offers to provide services "that would
be considered the practice of law, if offered by a lawyer in a law
firm.'" This standard necessarily involves an evaluation of the
work being performed. Such an evaluation requires an analy-
sis of the activities themselves, to determine whether the ac-
tivities are included in the definition of the practice of law.
Professional services firms currently perform legal work, refer-
ring to it as "consulting services." The lawyers working at the
professional services firms are referred to as "a member of our
team" or simply as a "consultant." As long as the professional
services firm does not use terms such as "our legal expert" or
"lawyer," it is more difficult to prove that they are "holding out"
that person as a lawyer. A person holds himself out as an at-
torney when he makes an express or implied representation
that he is authorized to practice law. Implied representations
include using business letterhead or business cards stating that
the person provides legal advice.
When clients are focusing on obtaining a workable solution
for what has been defined as a "business issue," they may not
realize that legal work has been provided to them. Quite a bit
of legal work is now delivered to chief financial officers and
other businesspersons, rather than to general counsels. When
the person receiving the advice on behalf of the client does not
have legal training, she is more likely to focus on the problem
and the alternative solutions, rather than trying to analyze
whether legal work has contributed to the work product she
has received.44
Thus, we have a situation in which legal analysis blends in
with other elements of the product delivered to the client. If
the firm does not label it as legal work product, and the person
eral public into thinking that she is a licensed attorney.
43. COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERIcAN BAR ASS'N,
REPORT APPENDIX A (1999), available at <http'./www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdpappendixa.html> [hereinafter APPENDIX A] (providing a revised Model
Rule 5.8 cmt. 3).
44. Indeed, M. Elizabeth Wall, former corporate counsel for a company in
the United Kingdom, testified before the MDP Commission that one of the Big
Five firms tried to include legal services when bidding on a project, even when
the request for proposals explicitly stated that legal services were not sought.
See Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Nov. 12,
1998) (testimony of M. Elizabeth Wall, Group Director of Legal and Regula-
tory Affairs at Cable & Wireless PLC), available at <http://www.abanet.
org/cpr/wall1198.html>.
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providing the service does not claim to be an attorney, it is
much more difficult to successfully prosecute the firm for
"holding out." This is an entirely different situation than that
of the nonlawyer who uses business cards proclaiming that he
holds a J.D. degree,45 who refers to himself as "counsel" for a
client,46 or who otherwise takes steps to create the impression
that he is an attorney.47
II. ENFORCEMENT OF LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL
MONOPOLY
A. PROFESSIONS COME INTO EXISTENCE WHEN CLIENTS
CANNOT ADEQUATELY ASSESS QUALIFICATIONS
A key characteristic of a profession 48 is that clients retain-
ing the services of the professional may not be able to accu-
rately evaluate the skills and qualifications of the service pro-
vider.49 A license serves as a way for potential clients to have
some assurance that basic qualifications have been met.50 But,
45. See Florida Bar v. Martin, 432 So. 2d 54, 54-55 (Fla. 1983) (stating
that by putting "J.D." after his name on business stationery and holding him-
self out as able to assist with resolving legal problems, a nonlawyer was en-
gaging in the unlicensed practice of law).
46. In Florida Bar v. Florida First Financial Group, 695 So. 2d 275, 276
(Fla. 1997), a nonlawyer implied that he was an attorney when he told third
parties that he "represented" a client and, when late for a meeting, he stated
that he had been held up in court on a case. See id. The court also found that
a second nonlawyer who referred to himself as "counsel" clearly held himself
out as an attorney. See id.
47. See Florida Bar v. Fuentes, 190 So. 2d 748, 749-52 (Fla. 1966) (finding
a notary public's actions and statements led people to believe that he was
authorized to practice law); Florida Bar v. Warren, 655 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla.
1995) (holding that defendant's actions constituted unlicensed practice of law).
48. See Posner, supra note 7, at 2 ("[Blecause the arcane skills of the pro-
fessional make his performance difficult for outsiders to monitor and therefore
facilitate exploitation, it is usually believed that the norms and working condi-
tions of a profession should be such as to discourage the undiluted pursuit of
pecuniary self-interest.")
49. The non-expert's difficulty in assessing the work has been termed
"credence qualities." See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and
Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1712-13 (1998) ("Legal services are
a kind of 'credence' good whose qualities non-expert clients must take on
trust."); see also Ellen R. Jordan & Paul H. Rubin, An Economic Analysis of
the Law of False Advertising, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 527, 530-31 (1979) (recognizing
that credence qualities are those which the non-expert consumer cannot moni-
tor or evaluate, even after consumption, and therefore, the consumer must
trust that the seller is providing the expected quality).
50. See Alan D. Wolfson et al., Regulating the Professions: A Theoretical
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in a world in which colleges are offering literacy classes be-
cause, as a result of social promotion policies, some high school
graduates are functionally illiterate,51 it is dangerous to cava-
lierly declare that consumers should be free to select anyone to
be their legal adviser-even if the person they select has no
background in the law. The degree to which the bar exam ac-
tually measures competence to practice has been controver-
sial.52 Nonetheless, requiring a bar exam at least assures that
individuals passing the exam can write coherent sentences and
perform basic legal analysis.
Due to similar information asymmetries, members of the
public encounter difficulties in evaluating the skills of persons
in other professions, such as surgeons or airline pilots. Anyone
who has flown in an airplane during a storm has taken some
comfort in the fact that the FAA has evaluated the skills of the
pilot. Although a deficiency in legal work is less dramatic than
a plane crash, the consequences of improper legal work per-
formed by a person who is not competent can be extremely
costly to the client. Mistakes in drawing wills and trusts, for
example, cannot be corrected once the settlor has died. Failure
to correctly interpret an EPA regulation could cost a client mil-
lions of dollars. Although one can criticize it as a paternalistic
stance, there are reasons to continue to require that persons
providing legal advice meet the minimum standards of licen-
sure. As many judicial opinions have observed, the protection
Framework, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE AND REGULATION 180, 197-212(Simon Rottenberg ed., 1980) (assessing a variety of methods of monitoring
attorney conduct, including the imposition of liability for malpractice, certifi-
cation and licensure).
51. The history of the attempts to impose liability on the educational in-
stitutions that award diplomas to functionally illiterate graduates is detailed
in John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educational Malpractice Claims: A Repre-
sentational Focus, 67 WASH. L. REV. 349 (1992) and in Kevin P. McJessy,
Comment, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating Educational
Liability Claims, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1768 (1995).
52. See generally Leon Green, Why Bar Examinations?, 33 Nw. U. L. REV.
908 (1939); Robert M. Jarvis, An Anecdotal History of the Bar Exam, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 359 (1996); Susan R. Martyn, Peer Review and Quality Assur-
ance for Lawyers, 20 TOLEDO L. REV. 295 (1989); Deborah L. Rhode, Institu-
tionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 690 (1994) ("No showing has
ever been made that performance either on bar exams or in law school corre-
lates with performance in practice."); Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need the
Bar Examination? A Critical Evaluation of the Justifications for the Bar Ex-
amination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191 (1995)
(favoring the elimination of the bar exam and institution of a mandatory ap-
prenticeship).
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of the public is the central concern in the regulation of the
practice of law.5
3
If one were to read papers discussing MDPs and replace
the phrase "practice of law" with the phrase "pilot an airplane"
or "perform surgery" it is easy to see the value of setting some
standards regarding who is permitted to undertake the practice
of law. At the margins there may be areas where non-surgeons
are adequately prepared to stitch up a minor cut or a paralegal
can fill in the blanks on a form to adopt a child. However, we
want someone whose skills have been carefully evaluated to
perform open-heart surgery or to assist a corporate client in
threading its way through a complex set of legal regulations
when a misinterpretation of the law could force the company
into bankruptcy.
B. THE PRACTICE OF LAW BY NONLAWYERS
Although the dangers detailed in the previous section are
serious, a number of respected academics have argued that
these dangers are outweighed by the importance of respecting
the client's choice of advisors. Professor Deborah Rhode and
others have proposed that UPL regulations should be com-
pletely dismantled. 54 Other commentators have instead advo-
cated limited licensure,55 certification, registration, or some
53. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 417 (Fla. 1980) (stating
that "[t]he single most important concern in th[is] Court's defining and regu-
lating the practice of law is the protection of the public from incompetent, un-
ethical, or irresponsible representation"); Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion on
Nonlawyer Representation in Sec. Arbitration, 696 So. 2d 1178, 1183 (Fla.
1997); Spivak v. Sachs, 211 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1965) (stating that the pur-
pose of New York's Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) provision is to "pro-
tect our citizens against the dangers of legal representation and advice given
by persons not trained, examined and licensed for such work").
54. See generally COMM'N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS: A REPORT WITH
RECOMENDATIONS 125 (1995) (concluding that states should change their
UPL provisions to allow nonlawyers to perform certain law-related activities);
Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences
Really Make Good Neighbors-or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 159; Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 209 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981); Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in
Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 701 (1996).
55. See Meredith Ann Munro, Note, Deregulation of the Practice of Law:
Placenta or Placebo?, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 203, 241 (1990) (arguing in favor of
licensing for nonlawyers rather than complete deregulation).
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other system of oversight for nonlawyer practice.56 There is a
certain amount of free market appeal to the notion that client
choice should be honored as a primary value and that all barri-
ers to entry to the legal services market should be dropped.
However, it is also reasonable to impose limits, which ensure
that persons providing legal services are held to at least certain
minimum standards.5 7
One can debate the precise form of those requirements.58
Eventually, states may adopt certification, educational re-
quirements, or licensing for legal technicians, 59 paralegals, 60
56. See generally Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2581 (1999); Alan Morrison, Defining the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: Some New Ways of Looking at an Old Question, 4 NOVA L.J.
363 (1980) (proposing that an independent agency balance the interests of
lawyers, nonlawyer competitors and clients); Carl M. Selinger, The Retention
of Limitations on the Out-of-Court Practice of Law by Independent Paralegals,
9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 879 (1996).
57. See Matthew A. Melone, Income Tax Practice and Certified Public Ac-
countants: The Case for a Status Based Exemption from State Unauthorized
Practice of Law Rules, 11 AKRON TAX J. 47, 51 (1995). Melone states that:
Restrictions placed upon the laity are justified by two broad argu-
ments. The first argument advanced is that regulation of law prac-
tice serves to maintain judicial integrity. Proponents of this theory
assert that regulation is needed to preserve courtroom decorum and
as an aid in disciplining miscreant attorneys. Secondly, and more
importantly, unauthorized practice restrictions are necessary in order
to prevent an unfettered market for legal services from harming con-
sumers.
See id. But see Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too
Much Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989, 1015-16
(1998) (arguing that adequate safeguards can be imposed when paraprofes-
sionals are allowed to provide legal services, with states requiring that practi-
tioners carry malpractice insurance, contribute to client security funds and
observe ethical obligations in connection with confidentiality, competence and
avoidance of conflicts of interest); Richard Abel, Big Lies and Small Steps: A
Critique of Deborah Rhode's Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much
Rhetoric, Too Little Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1019, 1025-27 (1998)
(urging increased access to paraprofessional services despite concern that le-
gal services provided by paraprofessionals would prove inferior to those pro-
vided by lawyers).
58. Several classic articles have been written on the subject. See gener-
ally Christensen, supra note 54; Edward V. Sparer et al., The Lay Advocate,
43 U. DET. L.J. 493 (1966); William P. Statsky, Paraprofessionals: Expanding
the Legal Service Delivery Team, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 397 (1972); Joaquin G.
Avila, Comment, Legal Paraprofessionals and Unauthorized Practice, 8 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 104 (1973).
59. See Joyce Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyanc-
ers-Empirical Evidence Says "Cease Fire!", 31 CONN. L. REV. 423, 466-71
(1999).
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social workers61 or other persons deemed capable of performing
certain law-related services. The arguments in favor of unbun-
dling legal services 62 are persuasive, especially in light of the
growing evidence of underserved 63 legal needs.64
60. See Mary M. Testerman, Bankruptcy Paralegal Regulation and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994: Legitimate Legal Assistance Options for the
Pro Se Bankruptcy Debtor, 23 CAL. BANKR. J. 37, 41 (1996) ("Typing is the
only activity paralegals can perform with absolute immunity."); see also A. Jay
Cristol, The Nonlawyer Provider of Bankruptcy Legal Services: Angel or Vul-
ture?, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 353, 361-65 (1994) (discussing the specific
activities which bankruptcy courts have decided constituted the unlicensed
practice of law); Sheryl Serreze, The Unauthorized Practice of the Law in
Bankruptcy Cases-Regulating "Petition Preparers", R.I. B.J., Jan. 1996, at 27-
28 (concluding that nonattorneys can be certain that they are not engaged in
UPL if they limit their services strictly to secretarial services, such as typing
bankruptcy forms for clients and copying written information provided by the
clients rather than interviewing them); Gary E. Sullivan et al., The Thin Red
Line: An Analysis of the Role of Legal Assistants in the Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
Process, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 15, 15 (1999).
61. See generally Anthony Bertelli, Should Social Workers Engage in the
Unauthorized Practice of Law?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 15 (1998).
62. See Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbun-
dling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 295
(1997) (arguing that unbundling would allow elderly clients who do not qualify
for legal aid to obtain affordable legal services); Michael Millemann et al., Re-
thinking the Full-Service Legal Representational Model: A Maryland Experi-
ment, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1178, 1191 (1997) (arguing that allowing law-
yers to undertake limited representations would increase the members of the
public who have access to an attorney); Melody Kay Fuller, Unbundling Fam-
ily Law Practice Creates Pro Bono Opportunities, COLO. LAW., Sept. 1998, at
29; Dianne Molvig, Unbundling Legal Services: Similar to Ordering a la Carte,
Unbundling Allows Clients to Choose from a Menu the Services Attorneys Pro-
vide, WIS. LAW., Sept. 1997, at 10; Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling Legal Serv-
ices: A Key Component in the Future of Access to Justice, OR. ST. B. BULL.,
Jan. 1997, at 9-12 (urging that malpractice standards and ethics provisions be
modified to permit unbundling); Vernetta L. Walker, Legal Needs of the Public
in the Future, FLA. B.J., May 1997, at 42, 42-43 (concluding that a client would
be better served if legal services were unbundled because if the client did not
need the "full-service" package, she could select the portion of the services
from the package that she actually wanted and could afford).
63. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 52, at 682 (stating that clients in the top
15% of the U.S. income bracket receive, at least, one half of the time attorneys
normally spend providing legal advice). In remarks given at the University of
Florida Law School on September 15, 1984, Justice Rehnquist proposed abol-
ishing or at least sharply limiting discovery in cases where the demand for a
money judgment is below a set threshold in order to reduce delay and expense
in simple civil litigation. See Government Abuses Judicial Monopoly: Our Le-
gal System's Quest for the "Correct" Results Costs Too Much, L.A. DAILY J., at
4 (Sept. 21, 1984).
64. See Report of the Working Group on the Use of Nonlawyers, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1813, 1813 (1999), and other papers in that symposium is-
sue, for an excellent discussion on how the use of nonlawyers could improve
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Nonetheless, given the information asymmetries between
the legal services provider and client,65 some evaluation of pro-
viders should be retained. Until such time as those reforms are
instituted,66 if a person is not licensed as a lawyer, he should
not be providing legal advice while renaming it consulting
services. No provider of legal services should be permitted to
unbundle until all providers, including licensed lawyers, are
explicitly permitted to do so.
C. "UNBUNDLING" LEGAL SERVICES
Historically, lawyers have not been permitted to "unbun-
dle" legal services; that is, provide some legal work without un-
dertaking a full representation of the client.67 Courts have
strongly condemned lawyers who, for example, ghostwrite legal
briefs for persons appearing pro se. For example, in Johnson v.
Board of County Commissioners, the court found that a lawyer
had violated Rule 11 and could be sanctioned for contempt
when the lawyer served as a ghostwriter for a litigant.68 The
court also found that a second lawyer had acted unethically
when that lawyer attempted to enter a limited appearance to
represent the litigant-a sheriff-only in his official capacity
and not as an individual. 69 Other courts in California,70 Kan-
sas,71 Maine,7 2 Montana 73 and Virginia74 have also condemned
access to justice for low-income persons.
65. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 112-26 (1989) (discussing
restrictive practices, competition among lawyers, and market failures requir-
ing external regulation).
66. This may be quite some time in the future because the persons with a
vested interest in the current system of legal services' delivery may not uni-
formly welcome such a change. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 7, at 3 ("[Tihe pro-
fession bent on maximizing its mystique will resist subspecialization-the
breaking up of its constituent tasks into subtasks-because that would tend to
demystify the profession's methods, to make them transparent.").
67. The term "discrete task representation" is also used to denote legal
work that is less than the traditional "full-service" representation. See, e.g.,
Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril
and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 253-54 (1999).
68. 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231-32 (D. Colo. 1994), affd on other grounds, 85
F.3d 489 (10th Cir. 1996).
69. See id. at 1229-31.
70. See Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 985-86 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
71. See Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 885-86 (D. Kan.
1997).
72. See Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971).
73. See In re Ellingson, 230 B.R. 426, 433-34 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999).
74. See Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968
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ghostwriting, as has the ABA.75 The ethics commission in
Massachusetts7 6 issued an opinion declaring that ghostwriting
pleadings is improper, while opinions in Alaska,7 7 Iowa,78 Ken-
tucky79 and New York 8° permit the practice, with varying re-
strictions. Commentators are similarly split, with some view-
ing ghostwriting as allowable until the point at which
pleadings are filed in a lawsuit,8 ' while others caution against
the practice. 82
Certainly, the prospect of unbundling legal services repre-
sents a significant change, which might be expected to encoun-
ter resistance. 83 However, recent scholarship, especially that
which has focused on the needs of moderate and low-income
clients, has suggested that some form of unbundling should be
F. Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1997).
75. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Ethics Op. 1414 (1978) (finding "extensive undisclosed participation by a law-
yer" to be improper).
76. See Massachusetts Bar Ass'n, Ethics Committee Op. 98-1 (1998)
(holding that subject to an evaluation of the facts in each case, limited back-
ground advice and counseling can properly be provided to a pro se litigant, but
attorneys cannot draft pleadings to be filed in court because doing so would
mislead the court and the other parties).
77. See Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Committee Op. 93-1 (1993) (determining
that an attorney is not required to disclose his participation, since judges can
determine when a pro se litigant has received help).
78. See Iowa State Bar Ass'n, Op. 96-31 (1997) (stating that lawyers must
inform the court of their participation).
79. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n, Op. E-343 (1991) (finding that lawyers may
limit their representation of an indigent pro se litigant to the preparation of
initial pleadings as long as their name appears somewhere on the pleading,
but should not continue to advise the client "behind the scenes" during the
litigation).
80. See New York State Bar Ass'n, Committee on Professional Ethics Op.
613 (1990) (holding that as long as lawyers inform the court of their participa-
tion, it is not improper to draft pleadings to be filed by a pro se litigant).
81. See, e.g., George W. Overton, Lawyers as Ghosts, CHICAGO BAR ASSN
RECORD, Nov. 1995, at 41 (suggesting that an attorney should alert the court
if the pro se litigant wants to use the attorney's services after the initial
pleadings are filed).
82. See Elizabeth J. Cohen, Afraid of Ghosts: Lawyers May Face Real
Trouble When They "Sort of" Represent Someone, 83 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at
80.
83. See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, And Such Small Portions: Lim-
ited Performance Agreements and the Cost/Quality/Access Trade-Off, 11 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 959, 974-76 (1998) (permitting greater unbundling and al-
lowing paraprofessionals to compete with lawyers in offering certain services
will allow less wealthy clients to obtain representation); Posner, supra note 7,
at 3.
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permitted.8 4 If these persons would otherwise not receive any
legal advice, something less than full representation could pro-
vide valuable assistance.8 5 Under one of the recommendations
made by those attending the Fordham Conference on the De-
livery of Legal Services to Low-Income Persons in December
1998, lawyers should be freed from an obligation to provide
"complete assistance with respect to the individual's legal
problem."86 The ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission is already con-
sidering amending the text and comment of Model Rule 1.2 to
explicitly permit limited representation in certain contexts.87
Of course, changes must be carefully evaluated to ensure that
client protection is not unnecessarily weakened in order to in-
crease access to legal advice.88
Some empirical evidence on this issue will soon be avail-
able in Colorado. Under Opinion 101, issued in September
1999,89 attorneys are permitted to provide unbundled legal
84. See Fred C. Zacharias, Limited Performance Agreements: Should Cli-
ents Get What They Pay For?, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 915, 933-36 (1998)
(suggesting that provisions of the ethics codes skew the availability of legal
services by overstating a lawyer's duties to clients who have explicitly agreed
to less than fifll service representation and positing that if the codes were
changed, poor and middle-class clients might have access to more competent
lawyers than those who are now willing to accept the fill service representa-
tions).
85. See generally Mary Helen McNeal, Having One Oar or Being Without
a Boat: Reflections on the Fordham Recommendations on Limited Legal Assis-
tance, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2617 (1999).
86. Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services
to Low-Income Persons, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751, 1776 (1999).
87. John S. Jenkins recommended amending Model Rule 1.2(c) to include
the sentence, "Limited objectives may be particularly appropriate in the case
of moderate-income clients." Hearings Before the Ethics 2000 Commission
(May 29, 1998) (testimony of John S. Jenkins, ABA Standing Committee on
the Delivery of Legal Service), available at <http'J/www.abanet.org/
cpr/jenkins.html>. The language that he proposes adding to the comment to
the rule would state: "When providing representation to moderate-income cli-
ents, and to other clients, it may be appropriate, after consultation with the
client, to limit the representation to providing brief advice such as that which
may be available through a bar association, other not-for-profit, or for-profit
telephone hotline service." Id.
88. ALBERT H. CANTRIL, AMERICAN BAR ASS N, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE, at vii-viii (1996); Lanctot, supra note
67, at 258 (calling for additional research on the possible harms to clients re-
ceiving limited advice); Mosten, supra note 62, at 14 (arguing that statutory
authority limiting lawyers' liability is needed to ensure that lawyers properly
undertaking limited representatioi are not later found to have committed
malpractice by refraining from providing a full-service representation).
89. See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1101:1901-02 (Sept. 29,
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services. They may do so as long as the lawyer provides compe-
tent representation 9° and explains the limits of the representa-
tion to the client (including the types of services not being of-
fered to the client) and the probable effect of those limits on the
client's rights and interests. This is clearly permissible under
Rule 1.2(c), which allows an attorney to "limit the scope or ob-
jectives, or both, of the representation if the client consents af-
ter consultation."91 The Colorado opinion lists some of the dis-
closures that should be made to pro se litigants,92 and
emphasizes the disclosures needed in certain cases, stating "[i]f
it is foreseeable that the client will probably need more com-
prehensive services, the lawyer may not accept the representa-
tion unless the client receives an adequate explanation of the
situation."93 Although this opinion does explicitly permit the
unbundling of legal services, it is quite likely that some Colo-
rado lawyers will avoid providing unbundled services, simply
because they cannot be certain that the explanation they are
providing to their clients will satisfy the requirement of an
"adequate explanation." The precise contours of the legal work,
which can be unbundled or performed on a limited basis, re-
mains an open question. However, to enhance access to the le-
gal system, especially by clients of moderate means, the profes-
sion should address the issue.
D. THE PRACTICE OF LAW BY NONLAWYERS IN MDPs
Although allowing nonlawyers to freely provide legal ad-
vice arguably would enhance access to the legal system, the
change would introduce too many difficulties that it should not
be pursued.94 The Commission's Final Report reflects current
case law when it states: "It should be stressed that the Com-
mission is not recommending that nonlawyers be permitted to
deliver legal services."95 One must read this statement to-
1999) (reprinting Colo. Ethics Committee Op. 101).
90. Competent representation refers to that which is required under
COLO. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1999).
91. Id. Rule 1.2(c).
92. Those disclosures include: a warning that the client may encounter
matters that he will not fully understand, such as the rules of evidence, the
elements of substantive legal claims and defenses and the consequences of
court rulings or stipulations. See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA)
1101:1902 (Sept. 29, 1999) (reprinting Colo. Ethics Committee Op. 101).
93. Id.
94. See text accompanying notes 48-66.
95. REPORT, supra note 2.
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gether with the cases interpreting the relevant provisions
adopted in each state. The regulations with which lawyers
must comply are modeled on the ABA's Model Code96 and the
Model Rules,97 which bring forward the ideas earlier stated in
Canon 47 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.98 Any ef-
fort to use MDPs as an opening wedge to explicitly permit per-
sons with no legal training to practice law should not be per-
mitted.
There is not enough evidence that clients will be well-
served by permitting persons other than licensed lawyers to
provide legal services. The issue has been highly controversial
and marshalling evidence has been difficult for those on both
sides of the question. Given the varying degrees of difficulty of
the legal tasks which nonlawyers have undertaken and the
range of experience which each nonlawyer possesses, crafting a
single policy to be applied in every situation will inevitably re-
sult in a certain number of inequitable decisions.
In addition, both sides have strong arguments supporting
their view-greater access to justice versus client protection.
The merits are so closely balanced that it may well be that the
determination hinges on which side has the burden of proof.99
If those asserting the need for change shoulder the burden of
proof, it would be difficult to demonstrate that there is no dan-
ger to clients in dismantling the assessment of qualifications of
those who want to deliver legal services. Once we create a sys-
tem which requires no demonstration of competence before
practicing law, it will be too late to prevent the damage that
96. The provisions relating to the unauthorized practice of law are con-
tained in Disciplinary Rule 3-101 of the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, which provides: "(A) A lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unau-
thorized practice of law. (B) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction
where to do so would be in violation of regulations of the profession in that ju-
risdiction." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101 (1969).
97. Model Rule 5.5 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
"A lawyer shall not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates
the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or (b) assist a person
who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes
the unauthorized practice of law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 5.5 (1983).
98. "No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be
used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay
agency, personal or corporate." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs Canon 47
(1937).
99. See Terry, supra note 5, at 920-25 (arguing that those defending the
status quo have not carried their burden of proof).
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can be wrought by persons who are not competent to provide
legal services. Liability for malpractice is not an adequate sub-
stitute for regulation of admission ex ante. The person who
gave erroneous legal advice might have disappeared or become
insolvent in the years intervening between the provision of the
advice and the discovery that it was inadequate. The difficulty
of defining the practice of law is one of the primary obstacles to
enforcing the requirement that only licensed attorneys be al-
lowed to practice law. Nonetheless, the task of defining the
practice of law must be undertaken to preclude the harms asso-
ciated with permitting nonlawyers to practice law.
III. DEFINING THE PRACTICE OF LAW AND ENFORCING
UPL PROHIBITIONS
As Professor Laurel Terry has noted, 1°° neither the wit-
nesses testifying before the Commission nor other commenta-
tors' 0 ' have been able to articulate a definition of "the practice
of law" that would be acceptable in all the jurisdictions in the
United States and would include transactional legal practice
without being over-inclusive. Even judges who have wrestled
with the issue have noted the difficulty of formulating the defi-
nition.10 2 William Freivogel of Attorney Liability Insurance
Assurance Society, Inc., (ALAS) testified before the Commis-
sion about the definition used for purposes of malpractice in-
surance coverage from ALAS.103 The ALAS insurance contract
defines the practice of law for purposes of coverage as drafting
contracts; trying lawsuits, arbitration, mediation; providing al-
ternative dispute resolution (ADR) services; acting as a notary
public, agent for a title insurance company, trustee, executor,
100. See id. at 872-73.
101. See, e.g., Bruce Balestier, Under One Roof- ABA Faces Arrival of Law-
yer-Accountant Pairings, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1998, at 5 (stating that the at-
tempt to sort out the issues connected with permitting law firms to merge with
accounting firms is made even more complex by "the sheer difficulty in at-
tempting to define the practice of law in an age where many disciplines are
called into play on various parts of a project").
102. State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 8-9 (Ariz.
1961) (en banc), modified, 371 P.2d 1020 (Ariz. 1962) ("In the light of the his-
torical development of the lawyer's functions, it is impossible to lay down an
exhaustive definition of the 'practice of law' ... ").
103. See Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
(Nov. 13, 1998) (testimony of William Freivogel, Loss Prevention Counsel for
ALAS), available at <http'//www.abanet.org/cpr/freivogel11198.html>.
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administrator, escrow agent or expert witness.104 However,
this definition, developed in the context of insuring risk, is ill-
suited for use as a prosecution standard because it includes ac-
tivities which clearly do not constitute the practice of law.105
The one aspect of law practice that can clearly be identified
is representing a client in court, but beyond the courtroom, it
becomes difficult to isolate activities that constitute the prac-
tice of law. After being criticized for its proposed definition of
the practice of law106 modeled on the definition in effect in the
District of Columbia, ° 7 the Commission backed off from at-
tempting to frame a definition in its December 1999 Updated
Background and Informational Report and Request for Com-
ments. The Commission invited comments regarding whether
it should define the practice of law in a subsequent recommen-
104. See id.
105. See id. (recognizing that "[c]ertain of these functions do not, in fact,
constitute the practice of law").
106. In Appendix A of its Final Report, the MDP Commission included an
amendment to the Terminology section of the Model Rules that proposed a
sample definition of the practice of law.
"Practice of Law" means the provision of professional legal advice or
services where there is a client relationship of trust or reliance. One
is presumed to be practicing law when engaging in any of the follow-
ing conduct on behalf of another:
(a) Preparing any legal document, including any deeds, mort-
gages, assignments, discharges, leases, trust instruments or any
other instruments intended to affect interests in real or personal
property, wills, codicils, instruments intended to affect the dispo-
sition of property of decedents' estates, documents relating to
business and corporate transactions, other instruments intended
to affect or secure legal rights, and contracts except routine
agreements incidental to a regular course of business;
(b) Preparing or expressing legal opinions;
(c) Appearing or acting as an attorney in any tribunal;
(d) Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings of any kind, or
any written documents containing legal argument or interpreta-
tion of law, for filing in any court, administrative agency or other
tribunal;
(e) Providing advice or counsel as to how any of the activities de-
scribed in subparagraph (a) through (d) might be done, or
whether they were done, in accordance with applicable law;
(f) Furnishing an attorney or attorneys, or other persons, to ren-
der the services described in subparagraphs (a) through (e)
above.
APPENDIX A, supra note 43.
107. The Report specifically notes that the definition it proposed was based
on language used in a single jurisdiction. "This definition is based in great
part on District of Columbia Rule 49, which the Reporter viewed as a useful
model." Id.
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dation, and stated that it is likely to leave the task of formu-
lating a definition to the individual jurisdictions.10 8 Although it
may be difficult to articulate a single definition to be adopted
nationwide, this does not indicate that the definitions currently
articulated in the various states through statutes, rules and
case law are unenforceable.
The Commission need not propose a single definition of the
practice of law to be adopted by all jurisdictions in the United
States because each jurisdiction has already developed its own
body of case law, statutes, court rule language, ethics advisory
committee opinions, and UPL committee opinions. Each state
will therefore define the practice of law within the context of its
own prior law. The effort to ascertain that qualified lawyers
are giving legal advice will be undertaken separately in each
individual jurisdiction and will be based on the particular body
of law which has been developed in that jurisdiction. It is un-
realistic to think that the enforcement authorities in each state
will uniformly adopt a new definition simply because it has
been proposed by the Commission. Therefore, it is not abso-
lutely necessary that the Commission formulate a model defini-
tion. However, writing a definition that is narrow enough to be
effectively enforced would assist prosecutors and bar counsel in
each state in evaluating their current standards.
The definitions currently in place typically contain the ex-
plicit statement that activities other than court appearances
constitute the practice of law, but each state articulates the
standard and the array of activity covered by the definition dif-
ferently. The context in which a court considers the issue has
some effect on the breadth of the language the court uses to ar-
ticulate the standard. Situations in which courts are consid-
ering whether or not a communication occurred while an attor-
ney was practicing law for purposes of deciding whether the
108. The Commission stated that:
[Its) intent was to leave the definition to the individual jurisdictions.
Accordingly, it did not include the definition in the Recommendation
but rather provided it as an example of one possible definition. The
Commission did not intend to use the term in an exclusive sense to
limit non-lawyer activity. Unfortunately, the Commission's intent
was not sufficiently clear. The Commission invites comment on
whether it should include a definition in any subsequent Recommen-
dation.
COSIISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS N,
UPDATED BACKGROUND AND INFORMATION REPORT AND REQUEST FOR
COMIENTS (1999), available at <http:/www.abanet.org/cpr/febmdp.html>
[hereinafter UPDATE].
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attorney-client privilege applies, the standard tends to be nar-
rower; while in cases in which a state UPL committee is moni-
toring a nonlawyer's work, the definition tends to be much
broader. The following section explores the current standards
in two jurisdictions in which the definition of the practice of
law has received significant attention-Washington and Flor-
ida.
A. CURRENTLY ENFORCED DEFINITIONS OF THE PRACTICE OF
LAW
1. Washington
In addition to court appearances, the definition of the prac-
tice of law announced in Washington's case law, in Perkins v.
CTX Mortgage Co.,109 and elsewhere, 110 includes "the selection
and completion of legal instruments by which legal rights and
obligations are established.""' Although simply filling out
forms is not the practice of law,"12 the determination of which
legal documents (such as promissory notes and deeds of trust)
are needed in a residential home financing does constitute the
practice of law." 3 Under Washington's definition, writing the
loan documents and providing content to the computer system
which will then select the appropriate documents in various
types of transactions is the practice of law. 114 The character of
the work performed itself determines whether a particular ac-
tivity is the practice of law,115 rather than whether or not a fee
is charged for that work.' 16
109. 969 P.2d 93, 96 (Wash. 1998) (en banc).
110. See Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 675 P.2d 193, 197 (Wash.
1983) (en banc); In re Droker, 370 P.2d 242, 248 (Wash. 1962); State v. Hunt,
880 P.2d 96, 99 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); Hecomovich v. Nielson, 518 P.2d 1081,
1087 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
111. Perkins, 969 P.2d at 95.
112. See Cultum v. Heritage House Realtors, Inc., 694 P.2d 630, 634
(Wash. 1985) (en banc) ("[A] real estate broker or salesperson is permitted to
complete simple printed standardized real estate forms, which forms must be
approved by a lawyer...."); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n
of Realtors, 251 P.2d 619, 622 (Wash. 1952) (en banc).
113. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 586 P.2d 870, 876 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (holding that the selection
and preparation of promissory notes and deeds of trust is the practice of law).
114. See id.
115. Droker, 370 P.2d at 248.
116. In Bennion, Van Camp, Hagan & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635
P.2d 730 (1981) (en banc), a law firm sued to enjoin an escrow company from
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In July 1999, the Committee to Define the Practice of Law
of the Washington State Bar Association issued its report con-
taining its definition of the practice of law, which essentially
adopted the standards set out in judicial opinions in the
state. 17 The general definition reads, "[tihe practice of law is
the application of legal principles and judgment with regard to
the circumstances or objectives of another entity or person(s)
which require the knowledge and skill of a person trained in
the law." 1 8 The definition then states that the practice of law
includes (but, is not limited to) four specific activities: (1) ad-
vising or giving counsel; 19 (2) drafting, selecting, or completing
legal documents;120 (3) representing another person in court;121
and (4) negotiating legal rights. 122 The committee identified
certain activities as excluded from its definition, including:
practicing under a limited license;123 serving as a court-
authorized facilitator; acting as a lay representative when do-
ing so is authorized by an agency or tribunal; serving as a neu-
tral;124 participating in labor negotiations;125 assisting another
preparing earnest money agreements and other acts as the unauthorized prac-
tice of law. See id. at 731. The unanimous court rejected the proposition that
by not charging a fee, the escrow company's actions were authorized under
Great Western, stating "[uit is the nature and character of the service rendered
rather than the fact of compensation for it that governs." Id. at 735; see also
Perkins, 969 P.2d at 96 (rejecting the notion that the definition of the practice
of law turns on whether a fee was charged); Great Western, 586 P.2d at 877
(declining to consider whether preparing a deed would be the practice of law if
no fee was charged).
117. COMITTEE TO DEFINE THE PRACTICE OF LAW, WASHINGTON STATE
BAR ASS'N, FINAL REPORT (1999), available at <http//www.wsba.org/c/
cdpl]/report.html>.
118. Id.
119. See id. ("Giving advice or counsel to others as to their legal rights or
the legal rights or responsibilities of others for fees or other consideration.").
120. See id. ("Selection, drafting, or completion of legal documents or
agreements which affect the legal rights of an entity or person(s).").
121. See id. ("Representation of another entity or person(s) in a court, or in
a formal administrative adjudicative proceeding or other formal dispute reso-
lution process or in an administrative adjudicative proceeding in which legal
pleadings are filed or a record is established as the basis for judicial review.").
122. See id. ("Negotiation of legal rights or responsibilities on behalf of an-
other entity or person(s).").
123. This includes limited licenses available for educational purposes, in-
house counsel and foreign law consultants. See id.
124. This exception refers to mediators, arbitrators, conciliators or facilita-
tors serving in a neutral capacity. See id.
125. See id. ("Participation in labor negotiations, arbitrations or concilia-
tions arising under collective bargaining agreements.").
20001 1343
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
person completing certain forms; 126 acting as a lobbyist; selling
legal forms; engaging in activities permitted under federal law;
and whatever additional activities the state's supreme court
determines is not UPL.
The difficulty with this definition is that it is vague. Stat-
ing that an activity constitutes the practice of law when the
judgment exercised "require[s] the knowledge and skill of a
person trained in the law" carries a flaw in the use of the
phrase "trained in the law." Independent paralegals can cer-
tainly argue that they meet that requirement, especially those
who have attended classes and obtained a certificate of comple-
tion in a paralegal program. Substituting the phrase "holding
a license to practice law" would provide some additional speci-
ficity. Use of that wording, however, highlights a second prob-
lem-the definition does not escape the circularity of the earlier
judicial opinions, 127 which state that the practice of law in-
cludes activities in which attorneys engage.
An additional problem is that the definition is overbroad.
While an overbroad definition seeks to ensure that prosecutors
or members of UPL committees will have the ability to act to
enjoin any conduct that they deem objectionable, individuals
trying to comply with the standard would benefit from a much
narrower definition and a bright-line test. Not only should in-
dividuals working in the gray areas have notice that their ac-
tions may subject them to UPL prosecution, but also, compli-
ance with such a standard would be much easier to police.
2. Florida
Florida has a history of active enforcement of its prohibi-
tion of UPL. The referees and judges' opinions generally spec-
ify the precise actions of the respondents and clearly articulate
the standards being applied, with the result that opinions from
Florida are among the most useful for those in other jurisdic-
tions seeking guidance about the appropriate standards.
The classic articulation of the standard used in Florida to
determine whether an activity constitutes the practice of law is
126. See id. (stating that as long as no fee is charged, a person can be
helped to complete forms seeking orders of protection under RCW chapter
10.14 (harassment) and 26.50 (domestic violence)).
127. See, e.g., State v. Chamberlain, 232 P. 337, 338 (Wash. 1925) (stating
that practicing law "means doing or practicing that which an attorney or
counsellor at law is authorized to do and practice").
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contained in State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry.128 The Sperry
definition focuses on the individual's activities, 129 rather than
on the location or the title of the person engaged in the activity.
As mentioned previously, representing a client in a court pro-
ceeding is clearly the practice of law. Courts have also held
that representing a client in arbitration is the practice of
law.130 The Sperry standard extends the definition to include
counseling clients regarding their rights and obligations under
the law and preparing legal instruments whether or not any
court proceedings are involved.131 The touchstone suggested is
whether the activity "affect[s] important rights of a person un-
der the law" and whether client protection requires "legal skill
and a knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the
average citizen."132 The Florida Supreme Court has continued
128. 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 373 U.S.
379 (1963).
129. [Ilt is not the nature of the agency or body before which the acts
are done, or even whether they are done before a tribunal or any sort or
in the private office of an individual, that determines whether that
which is done constitutes the practice of law. The best test, it seems to
us, is what is done, not where, for the safest measure is the character of
the acts themselves. If they constitute the practice of law the fact that
they are done in the private office of the one who performs them or be-
fore a nonjudicial body in no way changes their character.
Id. (emphasis added).
130. See Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion on Nonlawyer Representation in
Sec. Arbitration, 696 So. 2d 1178, 1180 (Fla. 1997). The court decided that a
person is practicing law when he offers advice and represents clients in the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or other stock exchange arbitra-
tion proceedings. See id. at 1181.
[The] nonlawyer representatives give specific legal advice and per-
form the traditional tasks of the lawyer at every stage of the arbitra-
tion proceeding in an effort to protect the investor's important legal
and financial interests. Because such activities-when performed by
nonlawyers-are wholly unregulated and unsanctionable, we further
agree with the proposed opinion that these activities must be en-
joined. In these circumstances, the public faces a potential for harm
from incompetent and unethical representation by compensated
nonlawyers which cannot otherwise be remedied.
Id. at 1183.
131. "[The practice of law also includes the giving of legal advice and
counsel to others as to their rights and obligations under the law and the
preparation of legal instruments, including contracts, by which legal rights
are either obtained, secured or given away...." Sperry, 140 So. 2d at 591.
132. Id.
[Iin determining whether the giving of advice and counsel and the
performance of services in legal matters for compensation constitutes
the practice of law it is safe to follow the rule that if the giving of such
advice and performance of such services affect important rights of a
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to apply the Sperry standard in its opinions evaluating various
activities. 133 The majority of those opinions address activities
that are performed by nonlawyers-persons who are not li-
censed to practice law in any jurisdiction.
Under Florida case law, nonlawyers are not engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law when they perform certain activi-
ties, such as selling sample forms, retyping written informa-
tion, 134 or simply gathering information to be used to complete
forms 35 in compliance with Florida Rule 10-2.1(a).136 However,
interviewing clients or answering their questions 137 to ascer-
tain which forms to use does constitute the practice of law.138
In addition, ascertaining whether forming a trust is appropri-
ate for the client, 39 counseling clients about their legal rights
person under the law, and if the reasonable protection of the rights
and property of those advised and served requires that the persons
giving such advice possess legal skill and a knowledge of the law
greater than that possessed by the average citizen, then the giving of
such advice and the performance of such services by one for another
as a course of conduct constitute the practice of law.
Id.; see also Florida Bar v. Florida First Fin. Group, Inc., 695 So. 2d 275, 277-
78.
133. See infra cases cited in notes 134-51.
134. See Florida Bar. v. American Senior Citizens Alliance, Inc., 689 So. 2d
255, 258-59 (Fla. 1997); Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1994
(Fla. 1978) (noting that the nonlawyer could have escaped prosecution if she
had simply typed forms, copying only the information given to her in writing
by the clients, or had sold only sample forms, without filling them out); see
also In re Samuels, 176 B.R. 616, 621-22 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) ("[P]ersons
wanting to provide services in the bankruptcy area are limited to typing or
transcribing written information provided to them by a consumer onto pre-
prepared forms.").
135. See American Senior Citizens Alliance, 689 So. 2d at 258-59.
136. RULES REGULATING FLA. BAR Rule 10-2.1(a) (1997) (restricting non-
lawyer oral communications solely to those eliciting factual information for
the completion of forms approved by Florida's Supreme Court.); see also Flor-
ida Bar re Approval of Forms Pursuant to Rule 10-1.1(b) of the Rules Regu-
lating the Florida Bar, 591 So. 2d 594, 595 (Fla. 1991) (approving "fill-in-the-
blank" forms developed by the Bar for use in "areas amenable to a forms prac-
tice").
137. See Florida Bar v. King, 468 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1985) (finding that a
nonlawyer had engaged in UPL when he "had direct contact in the nature of
consultation, explanation, recommendations, selection and completion of
forms").
138. See Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d at 1193-94 (enjoining a nonlawyer from
advising clients regarding the remedies available to them, making inquiries or
answering clients' questions as to which particular forms are necessary, how
best to fill out such forms, and where the forms should be filed).
139. See American Senior Citizens Alliance, 689 So. 2d at 259 (deeming
'answer[ing] specific legal questions, determin[ing] the appropriateness of a
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and remedies, 14° advising clients regarding whether the assets
of an ex-spouse should be listed in a client's bankruptcy peti-
tion, 141 advising clients on the availability of exemptions for as-
sets, 42 counseling clients on filing a bankruptcy petition 143 or
forming a trust' 44 have been found to constitute the practice of
law. In fact, any conversation between a client and a nonlaw-
yer has been viewed as so problematic that courts have sug-
gested that a typing service should tape-record all conversa-
tions. 145 A lawyer, rather than a nonlawyer, must make the
determination regarding whether a client needs a living
trust.146 And, only a lawyer is permitted to prepare and file a
corporate charter,147 or to represent clients in property damage
claims.148
But, even with all the case law applying the Sperry stan-
dard, Florida's definition of the practice of law is also over-
broad. The element most vulnerable to attack is "that degree of
legal skill and knowledge of the law greater than that of the
living trust based on a customer's particular needs and circumstances, as-
sembl[ing], draft[ing] and execut[ing] the documents, and fund[ing] the living
trusts" to be the unauthorized practice of law).
140. See Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d at 1189 (enjoining a nonlawyer from ad-
vising clients in marriage dissolution proceedings.); see also Florida Bar v.
Schramek, 616 So. 2d 979, 984 (Fla. 1993); In re Florida Bar, 215 So. 2d 613,
613-14 (Fla. 1968).
141. See Florida Bar v. Catarcio, 709 So. 2d 96, 98, 100 (Fla. 1998) (finding
that respondent had engaged in UPL when he advised clients regarding their
legal remedies and counseled the client and his ex-wife to file a joint bank-
ruptcy petition in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 302(a)).
142. See Florida Bar v. Davide, 702 So. 2d 184, 184 (Fla. 1997) (finding
that nonlawyers had engaged in the unlicensed practice of law by, among
other things, advising persons regarding bankruptcy exemptions).
143. See Florida Bar v. Warren, 655 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 1995) (enjoin-
ing a nonlawyer from counseling persons as to "the advisability of their filing
for protection under the U.S. bankruptcy laws").
144. See Florida Bar re Advisory Opinion-Nonlawyer Preparation of Liv-
ing Trusts, 613 So. 2d 426, 428 (Fla. 1992).
145. See In re Calzadilla, 151 B.R. 622, 626 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
146. See Nonlawyer Preparation of Living Trusts, 613 So. 2d at 427 (de-
ciding that the drafting, execution and funding of a living trust document con-
stitutes the practice of law and that the person making the determination re-
garding a client's need for a living trust must be a licensed lawyer).
147. See, e.g., In re Florida Bar, 355 So. 2d 766, 769 (Fla. 1978); Florida
Bar v. Scussel, 240 So. 2d 153, 155 (Fla. 1970); Florida Bar v. Fuentes, 190 So.
2d 748, 751 (Fla. 1966); Florida Bar v. Keehley, 190 So. 2d 173, 176 (Fla.
1966); Florida Bar v. Town, 174 So. 2d 395, 397 (Fla. 1965).
148. Florida Bar v. York, 689 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1996) (finding that a
nonlawyer practiced law when he reviewed statutes and served as a represen-
tative to accept responses from demand letters).
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average citizen."149 All people, including nonlawyers, have a
First Amendment right to gain information about the operation
of the law, whether through watching trials at the courthouse,
viewing CourtTV or other taped trials, or reading court opin-
ions. Unlike the reasonable person standard in tort law, it is
difficult to clearly envision the amount of legal knowledge the
average citizen possesses. Taken literally, this element also
purports to prohibit activity that is arguably protected by the
First Amendment. The argument that such an overbroad
standard constitutes a lack of notice foreclosing enforcement
was unsuccessfully raised in Florida Bar v. Schramek.150 In
that opinion, the Florida Supreme Court summarily rejected
the argument, finding it "totally without merit given that we
have specifically determined that the activities in which [the
nonlawyer] engage[d] do constitute the unauthorized practice
of law."151 The First Amendment and notice issues still linger,
however, and remain to be fully addressed in the future.
B. DEFINING ONLY LITIGATION AS THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Justice Enoch, of the Texas Supreme Court, drew quite a
bit of agreement from the audience after he testified before the
Commission in Dallas at the ABA Midyear Meeting in Febru-
ary 2000. He stated that courtroom practice could clearly be
defined as the practice of law, but added that including trans-
actional work in the definition creates an unacceptable level of
ambiguity. 152 If the definition is limited to representing an-
other before a tribunal, the practice of law would be relatively
simple to police since the presiding judge will always be in a
position to ascertain whether a person representing a client in
a case is, in fact, a member of the bar.
Justice Enoch's proposal highlights the fact that one of the
difficulties of enforcing UPL provisions in transactional prac-
149. State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), va-
cated on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
150. 616 So. 2d 979, 984 (Fla. 1993) (deciding that a nonlawyer had en-
gaged in unlicensed practice of law by providing services that "require[d] a
knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the average citizen" when
he answered clients' questions regarding who best to fill out trust documents,
modified court-approved forms, prepared living trusts and deeds, and inter-
preted Florida law).
151. Id.
152. Hearings Before the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (Feb.
12, 2000) (testimony of Justice Craig T. Enoch, Texas Supreme Court) (notes
on file with author).
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tice is that the work is performed in a private setting. Al-
though it is difficult, it is not impossible to articulate a reason-
able definition of the practice of law that would include trans-
actional legal practice. For the policy reasons stated earlier, 153
we in the profession ought to endeavor to articulate a definition
that goes beyond the courthouse. The need to ensure that cli-
ents are receiving legal advice from a person whose basic com-
petence has been evaluated is present in both transactional
work and in litigation.
C. A FUNCTIONAL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW
One approach to defining the practice of law is to set out a
conceptual framework rather than attempting to recite a laun-
dry list of activities that are included. In the interest of fur-
thering the discussion at this juncture, I propose the following
definition of the practice of law. In addition to representing
another person or entity before a court or other tribunal, the
practice of law includes:
The analysis and interpretation of statutes, regulations, opinions of
regulatory agencies, and judicial opinions for a client or their applica-
tion to a course of action contemplated by a client. The practice of
law includes drafting legal opinions and other documents which re-
flect that analysis and interpretation.
The core activities of legal practice are included in this defini-
tion. One might object that this definition is under-inclusive in
that it does not explicitly include pretrial activities, such as
evaluating whether a specific document is responsive to a
document production request, or is protected by the attorney-
client privilege. However, because the attorney's decisions are
made in light of precedent in the relevant jurisdiction, one
could also argue that in order to make those decisions, the at-
torney must follow precedent to the facts in the case at hand.
One additional activity, which arguably should also be in-
cluded in such a definition, is "communicating that analysis
and interpretation to the client." The attorney is typically the
person to directly advise the client of the results of the re-
search. The problem with including all such communication in
the definition is the First Amendment right to freely discuss
court decisions. Clearly, journalists and commentators must
remain free to discuss judicial opinions, proposed regulations,
statutes, and the like. And, just as clearly, any acquaintance of
153. See supra text accompanying notes 48-66.
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the client must remain free to declare his or her views regard-
ing the client's situation. For example, a parent or friend of the
client must not be deemed to be practicing law if she tells the
client who has lost his job that he can go to court to try to get
his alimony payments reduced. People must remain free to
discuss legal issues with nonlawyers because law forms the
background against which tax payments, accidents, real estate
transactions, and a myriad of other topics are played out in
daily life. The definition of the practice of law cannot prohibit
ordinary conversations on such topics.
The key distinction between such conversations and legal
work is the formation of the professional-client relationship.
Social conversation is a different category of discourse from a
discussion in which a person is seeking the considered advice of
a professional. Similarly, the one-way flow of information from
a journalist or television commentator is not a situation in
which the audience member is receiving an opinion tailored to
her particular situation. Legal work is performed in the con-
text of a professional-client relationship. Nonlawyers are not
able to form an attorney-client relationship with a client. Thus,
they cannot give the client legal advice in the context of that
relationship.
D. DISAGREEMENT OVER ENFORCEMENT OF UPL RESTRICTIONS
Despite the continued and growing dispute over how to de-
fine the practice of law, UPL enforcement continues to be a
critical task undertaken by the organized bar. For example, on
February 14, 2000, the ABA House of Delegates 15 4 passed
Resolution 8-A, urging regulators throughout the United States
to enforce the UPL rules more actively.155 In addition, in lan-
guage adopted over the objection of the ABA's Board of Gover-
nors, 156 the resolution also directs the ABA to establish a na-
tional clearinghouse for persons or organizations engaging in
154. The final vote was approved by a vote of 305 in favor, and 118 against.
See ABA Reverses Itself, Adopts New Rule Banning Lawyers' "Pay to Play"
Practices, 16 Laws. Man on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 64, 65 (Mar. 1, 2000).
155. The resolution "urges each jurisdiction to 'establish and implement
effective procedures for the discovery and investigation of any apparent viola-
tion of its laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law and to pursue ac-
tive enforcement of those laws.'" Id.
156. The Board's representative took the position that accumulating, veri-
fying, and distributing that information would impose "substantial" costs on
the ABA. See id.
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UPL in multiple jurisdictions. 57 In a discussion before the
vote, some delegates attempted to carve out exceptions for law-
yers whose practices encompass more than one state and for
multidisciplinary practices. 58 The fact that the proponents of
these changes were unsuccessful reflects the sentiment among
members of the House of Delegates to leave the current system
of UPL definitions and targets in place, rather than to institute
nuanced changes in UPL policy. The 1999 Survey of UPL
Committees, conducted by the ABA Standing Committee on
Client Protection, also indicates a trend toward enforcement of
the current system of UPL regulation. 59 Of the jurisdictions
responding, 160 twenty-nine claimed to be actively enforcing
their UPL provisions, 161 and the sixteen that foresaw changes
157. The resolution instructs the ABA to "establish and support a mecha-
nism for identifying and reporting to state, local, and territorial bar associa-
tions and designated authorities instances of persons or organizations engag-
ing in the unauthorized practice of law in more than one jurisdiction." Id.
158. See id.
159. ABA STANDING COMMI. ON CLIENT PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N,
1999 SURVEY OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW COIrTTEES (1999). This
report was released in September 1999. See id.
160. The jurisdictions in which an entity responsible for enforcement re-
sponded were: Alabama (UPL Committee), Alaska (State Bar Association),
Arizona (State Bar of Arizona-Ethics Director), Arkansas (Supreme Court of
Arkansas Committee on Professional Conduct), California (no entity speci-
fied), Colorado (UPL Committee), Connecticut (UPL Committee), Delaware
(Office of Disciplinary Counsel), District of Columbia (D.C. Court of Appeals
Committee on UPL), Florida (Bar UPL Counsel), Georgia (State Bar), Hawaii
(Deputy Attorney General and Consumer Protection Committee), Idaho (Bar
Counsel), Illinois (State Bar Association), Indiana (UPL Committee), Iowa
(Iowa Supreme Court Commission on UPL), Kansas (Bar Counsel), Kentucky
(Bar Counsel), Louisiana (Bar Association), Maine (Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral), Maryland (Bar Counsel Attorney Grievance Commission), Massachu-
setts (Consumer Protection and Antitrust Division Attorney General and Bar
Counsel), Michigan (State Bar), Minnesota (Lawyers' Professional Responsi-
bility Board), Mississippi (State Bar), Missouri (Office of Chief Disciplinary
Counsel), Montana (no entity specified), Nebraska (Counsel for Discipline and
UPL Committee), New Hampshire (Assistant Attorney General), New Mexico
(no entity specified), New Jersey (Bar Counsel and Supreme Court UPL
Committee), New York (Bar Counsel), North Carolina (Bar Counsel), North
Dakota (State Bar), Ohio (Supreme Court and Board of Commissioners on
UPL), Oklahoma (Bar Counsel), Oregon (State Bar), Pennsylvania (Discipli-
nary Board, Supreme Court), Rhode Island (UPL Committee), South Carolina
(State Bar), South Dakota (State Bar and Consumer Protection Committee),
Tennessee (Attorney General's Office), Texas (State Bar), Utah (Bar Adminis-
trator), Vermont (Attorney General and Bar Association), Virginia (State Bar),
Washington (State Bar), West Virginia (State Bar), Wyoming (State Bar), Vir-
gin Islands (Bar Association). See id. at 2-3.
161. The jurisdictions reporting active enforcement were: Alabama, Arkan-
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in policy all anticipated more active UPL enforcement in the
year ahead. 162
Any broadbrush move to "man the barricades" would be
unfortunate, especially at this time. It is important to use a
nuanced approach; analyzing precisely what changes need to be
made and which aspects of the current system should be left in
place.
IV. IMPUTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The final critical issue to be analyzed in this Article is the
degree to which conflicts of interest attributed to one member
of an MDP must be imputed to the other members of the prac-
tice. If one attorney at a law firm has a conflict of interest that
precludes accepting a representation, that conflict is imputed to
all the other lawyers at the firm.163 No lawyer at the firm can
accept that representation unless the conflict is waivable, it is
adequately disclosed to the client, and the client agrees to
waive the conflict. The conflict is imputed because the client is
thought to hire the law firm (rather than the individual attor-
sas, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylva-
nia, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Washing-
ton. See id.
162. The jurisdictions anticipating more active enforcement were: Arizona,
Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah and Washing-
ton. See id. at 9-10.
163. Model Rule 1.10 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall
knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone
would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 [the general rule on
conflicts], 1.8(c) [gifts], 1.9 [former clients] or 2.2 [lawyer as interme-
diary].
(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the
firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with in-
terests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the for-
merly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm,
unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in
which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
(2) any lawyer remaining in the firm has information pro-
tected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter.
(c) A disqualification prescribed by this rule may be waived by the
affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1987).
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ney),1 4 and because of the collegiality of traditional legal prac-
tice, in which lawyers routinely "run ideas by" other lawyers at
their firms. The two primary theoretical reasons supporting
imputation are the presumption of shared confidences and the
duty of loyalty. First, any confidential information received by
an individual attorney from a client is presumed to be shared
with other attorneys at the firm and, second, the attorney's
duty of loyalty is meant to ensure that the attorney remains
free to assist her client in pursuing that client's objectives.
Other professions do not impute conflicts to other members of
the same firm. For example, only the accountant who actually
has the conflict is precluded from taking conflicting work in a
professional services firm. Other members of his firm are able
to take on the conflicting matter because the conflict is not im-
puted to them.
Recommendation 8 of the Commission's Final Report pro-
poses that "all clients of an MDP should be treated as the law-
yer's clients for purposes of conflicts of interest and imputation
in the same manner as if the MDP were a law firm and all em-
ployees, partners, shareholders or the like were lawyers."165 In
addition, the Commission in its Final Report proposed adding
the following language to the comments to Rule 1.10, the Model
Rule covering imputed disqualification:
[41 With respect to an MDP, imputed disqualification of a lawyer ap-
plies if the conflict in regard to the legal services the lawyer is pro-
viding is with any client of the MDP, not just a client of a legal serv-
ices division of the MDP or of an individual lawyer member of the
MDP.166
The proposal that conflicts of interest be imputed across the en-
tire professional service firm is conceptually acceptable to at-
torneys, since attorneys would be subject to the same standards
whether they work in a law firm or in a multidisciplinary prac-
tice.
Understandably, however, members of other professions
have been quick to protest. The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) adopted a resolution stating that
the Commission's proposal to impose legal rules onto account-
164. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession:
A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869 (1990).
165. COMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
RECOMIMENDATION Recommendation 8 (1999), available at <http'//www.
abanet.orgmdprecommendation.html> [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION].
166. See APPENDIX A, supra note 43.
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ing firms is "clearly inappropriate and overreaching." It is
clear that AICPA's view of the appropriate conflicts standards
for MDPs would be to allow the current accountant's standards
to govern. If this were permitted, it would ultimately lead to a
situation in which a conflict would be imputed to a lawyer
working in a traditional in-house legal department or law firm,
when the same conflict would not be imputed to a lawyer prac-
ticing law in an MDP. This cannot be condoned. The same
standards must apply to all persons providing legal advice.
In an attempt to address the objections raised by members
of other professions, the Commission is considering changing
its original position requiring that the rules of imputation ap-
ply to all matters in which the MDP rendered services for any
client. In its PostScript to the February 2000 Midyear Meet-
ing, the Commission stated that imputed conflicts could be
limited to only those representations in which MDP clients had
purchased legal services, rather than to all the clients of the
MDP.167 Although limiting the imputation of conflicts to legal
service purchases would trigger fewer imputed conflicts, the
concerns expressed by members of other professions still re-
main. In addition, the lawyers practicing law in Big Five firms,
and other professional services firms, will continue to assert
that they are "practicing estate planning" or "consulting" (in
which case the conflicts will not be imputed) rather than prac-
ticing law. This continues the differential in conflict analysis
as applied to lawyers practicing in MDPs and as applied to
work performed by lawyers practicing in traditional law firms
where all the partners are attorneys. As discussed earlier in
this Article, all lawyers should be subject to the same imputa-
tion standards, wherever they are practicing.
Similarly, problems will remain if the Commission recom-
mends that conflicts be imputed to only the attorneys in a mul-
tidisciplinary practice, rather than to all of the professionals
working at the entity. Doing so would ameliorate concerns ex-
pressed by members of other professions who objected to being
required to comply with lawyers' standards, but it is not an al-
together satisfactory solution. Imputing conflicts to all of the
lawyers in an MDP will still require the MDP to institute more
elaborate structures to check conflicts. In addition, it will insti-
tute a new requirement that professionals employed by MDPs
obtain client waivers in situations where previously neither cli-
167. POSTSCRIPT, supra note 33.
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ent consent nor waiver had been required. Moreover, the
regulations under which attorneys practice provide that certain
conflicts cannot be waived. An MDP employing attorneys thus
would encounter situations in which certain representations
could not be undertaken. Professional services firms are un-
likely to welcome these additional burdens. As a result, a cer-
tain number of the many attorneys now working at MDPs will
not "come into the tent" and officially rejoin the legal profes-
sion. Instead, they are likely to continue providing legal serv-
ices while they declare that they are working only as consult-
ants rather than practicing law. Therefore, the problems
currently encountered in the area of the unauthorized practice
of law will remain.
In addition, imputing the conflicts of interest only to the li-
censed lawyers at an MDP compromises the core values un-
derlying the requirement of imputation. The lawyers in MDPs
will be working as members of teams, along with accountants,
engineers, business analysts and other professionals. Those
nonlawyer members of the MDP will be attending meetings
and included on conference calls between the attorneys and the
clients. The nonlawyers will have the opportunity to learn con-
fidential client information, strategy, and other information
that the client discloses to the attorney member of the team.
The reason conflicts are imputed across an entire law firm is
that, as a practical matter, this is precisely the type of team-
work which is thought to occur among the members of a law
firm working on a matter for a client.
The Commission's approach of attempting to identify core
values of the legal profession, and to urge that states author-
izing MDPs require the attorneys practicing in MDPs to honor
the disciplinary and ethical standards of the legal profession is
laudable. Unfortunately, it most likely will not work. If con-
flicts are imputed to other persons working in an MDP, the
magnitude of the business lost due to the imposition of the new
conflicts standards is likely to lead management at the Big Five
and other large professional services firms to pressure attor-
neys working in those organizations to resign their law li-
censes. The lawyers currently working for the Big Five are
thus unlikely to "come into the tent" and agree to follow the
conflicts regulations applicable to lawyers practicing in other
settings.
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V. REGULATIONS THAT IMPEDE LAWYERS'
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE
Whether or not the states' disciplinary rules are changed to
permit MDPs to deliver legal services, the MDP debate has
brought attention to regulations that currently hamper lawyers
conducting multijurisdictional practices in law firms and corpo-
rate legal departments. The restrictions on lawyers practicing
in traditional settings should not be more onerous than those
envisioned for lawyers practicing in MDPs. Certainly, if fully
integrated MDPs are authorized, the legal profession ought to
take down the barriers of unauthorized practice of law as ap-
plied to lawyers licensed in other states and reconsider the im-
putation of conflicts of interest across all the members of a law-
yer-only law firm.
Currently, for purposes of UPL enforcement, lawyers li-
censed in other states are treated the same as persons who
have no legal training at all. This must be changed to allow
persons who have met the requirements of bar membership to
practice law freely. The ABA Ethics 2000 Commission is con-
sidering revisions to Model Rule 5.5, which would broaden the
scope of practice permitted for the out-of-state lawyer. If the
changes are adopted, in addition to authorized appearances be-
fore a tribunal, the out-of-state lawyer would be permitted to
"act[] with respect to a matter that arises out of or is otherwise
reasonably related to the lawyer's practice on behalf of a client
in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice." 168
In addition, the out-of-state lawyer would be permitted to prac-
tice law as long as an attorney admitted in the jurisdiction is
associated in the matter. 169 Furthermore, lawyers working in
corporate legal departments are deemed not to be engaged in
UPL when the in-house lawyer acts on the client's behalf.170
The Ethics 2000 Commission is likely to recommend the
amendment of Model Rule 5.5 to create this exemption from
UPL prosecution for in-house lawyers. Making such a change
in the language in Model Rule 5.5 would encourage wider adop-
tion of the authorization to practice for out-of-state in-house
168. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5(b)(2)(ii) (proposed
language), available at <http'//www.abanet.orgcpr/ethics2k.html>.
169. See id. Rule 5.5(b)(2)(iii) (proposed language).
170. See id. Rule 5.5(b)(2)(i) (proposed language). The in-house counsel li-
censed in another state would also be allowed to practice on behalf of other
employees or commonly owned organizational affiliates in connection with the
client's matters.
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counsel that is already in place in fifteen jurisdictions in the
United States, including Alabama, 17 1 the District of Colum-
bia,172 Florida, 7 3 Idaho, 174 Kansas,175 Kentucky, 176 Maryland, 177
Minnesota, 178 Missouri, 7 9 North Carolina,180 Ohio,181 Okla-
homa,182 South Carolina, 183 Virginia, 184 and Washington. 85
Such wider adoption of a license for out-of-state in-house coun-
sel would be beneficial, but would not address the needs of law-
yers working in law firms, especially those engaged in transac-
tional practice, where pro hac vice admission is not available.18 6
All of the proposed changes to the language in Model Rule
5.5 considered by the Ethics 2000 Commission should be made.
171. See Ala. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Committee Op. RO-86-52 (1986).
172. See RULES OF THE D.C. CT. APP. Rule 49(c)(6) (1999).
173. See RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR ch. 17 (1997). The in-house at-
torney must renew his status annually, but there is no cap on the maximum
number of years it is available. See id. Rule 17-1.4 (c).
174. See IDAHO BAR COMMISSION RULES Rule 220 (1998).
175. See KAN. SUP. CT. RULES 706(c) (1997). The permit to practice in
Kansas expires if the attorney terminates his in-house employment, but it is
not time-limited. See id.
176. See KY. SUP. CT. RULES Rule 2.111 (2000). Attorneys who receive this
status are not eligible to appear in court. See id. Rule 2.111(4)(b).
177. See MD. CODE. ANN. BUS., OCC. & PROF. CODE § 10-206(b) (1995).
Attorneys practicing with this status cannot appear in court. See id.
178. See MINN. SUP. CT. RULES Rule 6 (1997). The temporary license
available under this rule is good for only one year. See id.
179. See MO. SUP. CT. RULES Rule 8.105 (2000). The authorization to prac-
tice for the corporate employer can be renewed for successive five year periods.
See id. Rule 8.105(f). The time an in-house lawyer practices under this rule
cannot be used to fulfill the conditions for admission without examination un-
der Rule 8.10. See id. Rule 8.105(g).
180. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-4 (1995); State v. Pledger, 127 S.E.2d 337,
339-40 (N.C. 1962) (interpreting the North Carolina statute to permit an out-
of-state in-house counsel to practice within the state).
181. See RULES GOVERNING CTS. OHIO Rule 6 § 4(A) (1999). The authori-
zation is renewable for a series of two-year terms. See id.
182. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, app. Rule 2 § 5 (Supp. 2000) (providing
that an in-house lawyer can practice under this exemption for an open-ended
period of time).
183. See S.C. SUP. CT. RULES Rule 405 (1997).
184. In Virginia, the definition of the unauthorized practice of law excludes
practice by in-house counsel. See Virginia UPL Comm. Op. 178 (1994).
185. WASH. CT. RULES Rule 8(f) (1999-2000). The rule creates an exception
for in-house counsel, but still requires that the out-of-state lawyer pass the
professional responsibility portion of the state's bar exam. See id.
186. For further analysis of the restrictions on multijurisdictional practice,
see generally Carol A. Needham, Splitting Bar Admission into Federal and
State Components: National Admission for Advice on Federal Law, 45 U. KAN.
L. REV. 453 (1997).
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Once these changes are adopted in the Model Rules, a number
of states should consider revising their provisions to incorpo-
rate these changes. In addition to changes in the professional
responsibility provisions governing lawyers, the UPL Commit-
tees and other entities responsible for issuing advisory opinions
on ethics issues in each state should also confirm that out-of-
state lawyers are not committing UPL when they give legal ad-
vice in their state.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the debate over the composition of entities permitted to
deliver legal services, certain issues stand out as of fundamen-
tal importance. If MDPs are approved, an MDP firm should
not be allowed to provide legal services for an audit client of the
MDP. Persons who are practicing law should be held to the
same standards of competence and loyalty, whether or not they
acknowledge that the work they are performing constitutes the
practice of law. Courts must evaluate the activities performed
by all persons practicing law, rather than examining the activi-
ties of only those persons who hold themselves out as attor-
neys. The Commission need not propose a national definition
of the unauthorized practice of law, and each state can continue
to enforce the standards that have been developed in statutes,
case law, and ethics advisory opinions in that state. Conflicts
of interest attributed to members of an MDP should be imputed
to the other professionals at the MDP on the same basis as the
conflicts would be imputed to other lawyers working in a law
firm. Of course, the screening measures, which in a law firm
would be effective, should also be adequate if implemented in
an MDP. Finally, the debate concerning MDPs has focused at-
tention on the regulations that currently hamper lawyers con-
ducting a multijurisdictional practice in law firms and corpo-
rate legal departments. The restrictions on lawyers practicing
in traditional settings certainly should not be more onerous
than those envisioned for lawyers practicing in MDPs.
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